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ABSTRACT
The Role of Intuition in
Philosophical Practice
by
WANG Tinghao
Master of Philosophy
This dissertation examines the recent arguments against the “Centrality” thesis—the
thesis that intuition plays central evidential roles in philosophical inquiry—and their
implications for the negative program in experimental philosophy. Two types of
objections to Centrality are discussed. First, there are some objections which turn out
to only work against Centrality when it is taken as a potential form of philosophical
exceptionalism. I respond by showing that negative experimental philosophy doesn’t
need the assumption that philosophy is distinctive in its reliance on intuitions.
Second, there are some objections which turn out to be related to some particular
view concerning the nature of evidence. In response, I distinguish between several
different versions of Centrality, and argue that the version of Centrality that
experimentalists need remains innocuous. Though none of the arguments against
Centrality works as intended, I agree with its opponents that negative experimental
philosophers have mischaracterized philosophical practice in a way which has
problematic consequences for at least some versions of their argument. Specifically,
I contend that philosophical practice grants important evidential status to general
intuitions and context-rich intuitions, but extant experimental studies have almost
exclusively focused on case intuitions and context-poor intuitions. I conclude that
those who work on the negative program of experimental philosophy need to more
carefully examine how philosophers actually use intuition in their practice.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

Traditional philosophical methodology has received much criticism from the
“negative program” in experimental philosophy.1 I will refer to the philosophers
engaging in this program as “experimentalists” and their criticism as the
“experimental critique.” Experimentalists conduct psychological research, mainly
using survey methods, to investigate people’s intuitive responses to thought
experiments. Two early well-known findings suggested that non-Westerners
surprisingly do not share Westerners’ intuitions about Gettier cases (Weinberg,
Nichols, & Stich, 2001) and Kripke’s (1980) Gödel case (Machery, Mallon, Nichols,
& Stich, 2004).2 Given that demographic background is plausibly irrelevant to the
truth of judgments in those cases, many experimentalists concluded that the intuitive
disagreements stem from cultural bias. More recently, experimentalists have
performed surveys which show that intuitive judgments vary as a function of other
irrelevant factors like the subject’s personality (e.g., Feltz & Cokely, 2009), age (e.g.,
Colaço, Buckwalter, Stich, & Machery, 2014), gender (e.g., Buckwalter & Stich,
2014), and the order in which cases are considered (e.g., Swain, Alexander, &
Weinberg, 2008; Liao, Wiegmann, Alexander, & Vong, 2012).

1

A common distinction is made between the “positive program” and the “negative program” in
experimental philosophy. According to Alexander and Weinberg (2007), while the negative program
“challenges the usefulness” of the current intuition-based philosophical practice, the positive program
takes it that “experimental philosophy is (at least an indispensable part of) the proper methodology for
this practice” (p. 298).
2
Weinberg et al.’s finding fails to be replicated by more recent experimental work (e.g., Nagel, Juan,
& Mar, 2013; Kim & Yuan, 2015; Seyedsayamdost, 2015; Machery, Stich, et al., 2015). By contrast,
cross-cultural variation of intuitions in the Gödel case has been more robustly replicated (see, e.g.,
Machery et al. 2010; Machery, Sytsma, & Deutsch, 2015; Sytsma, Livengood, Sato, & Oguchi, 2015).
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According to experimentalists, the above survey data don’t merely suggest that
some particular philosophical views (e.g., the view that the Gettier case isn’t a case
of knowledge) are ill-grounded, but in one way or another present a serious challenge
to the standard methodology of philosophy. Defenders of traditional “armchair”
philosophy have offered a number of different lines of response. Some (e.g., Ludwig,
2007; Cullen, 2010; Bengson, 2013) distinguish between subjects’ answers to survey
questions and subjects’ intuitions. It is then argued that, though experimentalists
have discovered variation among survey answers, they haven’t found variation
among intuitions. Others (e.g., Kauppinen, 2007; Horvath, 2010; Devitt, 2011) hold
the view that only trained philosophers’ intuitions play a substantial role in
philosophical methods. Since most experimental studies test intuitions of lay people,
it is claimed, they pose no serious threat to standard philosophical methodology.
Several philosophers have recently raised a different objection to the
experimental critique, by denying that any intuitions play a substantial role in
philosophical methods at all. They contend that the experimentalists’ data do not
support their conclusion, since that conclusion relies on the following false
assumption:
(Centrality) Intuition plays a central evidential role in philosophical
practice.3
I will refer to this sort of objection to the experimental critique as the “anti-Centrality
response.” Main proponents of this response include Williamson (2007), Deutsch
(2009, 2010, 2015), and Cappelen (2012). Some other philosophers (e.g., Gendler,
2007; Earlenbaugh and Molyneux, 2009, 2010; Molyneux, 2014; Ichikawa and
3

I borrow the term “Centrality” from Cappelen (2012, p. 3).

2

Jarvis, 2013) have also expressed worries with the Centrality thesis, though they
don’t explicitly use those worries to cast doubt on the importance of the experimental
critique.
It might be helpful to distinguish Centrality from several other views. First,
Centrality is primarily a descriptive claim concerning what role philosophers actually
grant to intuition. It doesn’t imply the normative claim that intuition ought to or
should play its current role. Second, Centrality describes the usage of intuition in
philosophical inquiry. It is different from the view that philosophers think of
themselves as giving intuition a central evidential role; it is possible that they have
misconceptions about their own practice. For instance, Bealer (1992) argues that
Quinean empiricists in fact make use of a wide range of intuitions. However, they
don’t conceive of intuition as having any evidential role in their theorizing, since
they are committed to Quine’s principle of empiricism, according to which only
experiences and observations constitute prima facie evidence. Third, Centrality
doesn’t entail that intuition plays the only important or even the most important
evidential role in philosophy. It is merely the claim that intuition has a central
evidential role to play, regardless of whether there is something else that plays an
equally central role.
In the next two Chapters of the dissertation, I shall defend Centrality by
responding to four recent arguments against it. The first argument is the “argument
from linguistic practice,” according to which Centrality doesn’t fit in well with
philosophers’ use of “intuition”-terminology in their texts. The second argument is
the “argument from cognitive capacities,” which involves the claim that intuition has
no significant epistemological status within philosophy because it has no significant
status in the psychology of philosophical thinking. Both arguments, I shall argue, are
3

only effective against Centrality when it is treated as an instance of philosophical
exceptionalism. I then argue that, since experimentalists do not need to assume
philosophical exceptionalism, these two anti-Centrality arguments fail to undermine
the importance of the experimental critique.
The other two anti-Centrality arguments I shall examine are the “argument
from non-neutrality” and the “argument from reasoning.” Both arguments are related
to some particular view regarding the nature of evidence. The former argument
alleges that Centrality is ill-motivated by the principle of “Evidence Neutrality.” I
reject this argument by distinguishing between a strong version and a weak version
of Centrality. I then claim that, though the argument might work against the strong
version, the weak version remains untouched. The latter argument involves the
thought that we seldom reason from propositions concerning intuitions; I’ll suggest
that this argument tacitly assumes that evidence has to be propositional. My
objection to the argument from reasoning is mainly based on an analogy between
intuition and perception. While there is a similar problem in the case of perception, I
shall argue, nearly no philosopher would deny perception’s evidential role on the
basis of that problem. It thus remains unclear why one is supposed to deny Centrality
in the case of intuition.
After responding to the anti-Centrality arguments, in Chapter 4, I shall develop
my own criticisms of the experimental critique. Experimentalists are right that
philosophers extensively make use of intuitions; nevertheless, my worry is that
experimentalists rely on false assumptions about how philosophers use intuitions.
More specifically, experimentalists tend to assume that intuitions about particular
cases are granted a primary evidential role; by contrast, I will provide several reasons
to think that general intuitions occupy a more prominent evidential status. Further,
4

experimentalists typically elicit intuitions through vignettes containing little
contextual information. However, philosophers’ use of intuition involves more
contextual information—it is “context-rich” rather than “context-poor.” The above
differences between philosophers’ and surveys’ appeals to intuition, I shall argue,
constitute a problem for some versions of the experimental critique, such as
Weinberg’s 2007 version.
A final issue is worth addressing. In this dissertation, I describe two of
Williamson’s (2007) arguments—the “argument from cognitive capacities” and the
“argument from non-neutrality”—as arguments against Centrality. But it is not
totally clear whether this is his intention. According to an alternative interpretation,
when Williamson asserts that philosophical evidence doesn’t consist of intuition, he
doesn’t mean to deny Centrality; instead, he means that philosophers shouldn’t use
intuitions as evidence.4 I maintain that Williamson’s target is Centrality, for he
explicitly claims that his “rethinking of philosophical methodology” concerns “how
philosophy is actually done” (2007, p. 6). But there is still a crucial difference
between Williamson and other critics of Centrality like Deutsch and Cappelen, both
of whom are inclined to adopt the extreme view that intuition never plays any
evidential roles in philosophy. Cappelen (2012), for example, aims to argue that “it is
not true that philosophers rely extensively (or even a little bit) on intuitions as
evidence” (p. 1). Also, Deutsch (2015) claims that “philosophical arguments never
appeal to the intuitiveness of a judgment about a case in order to justify belief in that
judgment” (p. 76–77). In contrast, Williamson’s position seems to be more moderate.
He thinks philosophers sometimes do treat intuitions as evidence, especially when
they are under the pressure to “psychologize” their evidence. He admits that a
4

Cappelen (2012, p. 204), for instance, assumes such an interpretation of Williamson’s view.
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misconception of philosophical methodology “does more than distort philosophers’
descriptions of philosophy” and “alters their first-order philosophizing” (2007, p.
213). This suggests that intuition has some non-central evidential role in philosophy,
mainly because beliefs about Centrality have changed part of philosophical practice.
In any event, in the sections where I discuss the arguments Williamson offers, my
goal will be to examine whether one could reasonably reject Centrality based on
these arguments, whatever Williamson’s intended target is. Similarly, my aim in
those sections will be to examine whether Williamson’s arguments undermine the
experimental critique, no matter whether Williamson himself intends to reject the
experimentalists’ project on the basis of anti-Centrality arguments.5

5

Williamson doesn’t explicitly use the arguments against Centrality to criticize experimentalists.
Instead, he has two other worries about the experimental critique: (i) It leads to an unsustainable form
of “judgment skepticism” and (ii) it relies on data reporting variation of intuition among lay people
rather than trained philosophers. However, one might easily understand Williamson as implicitly
criticizing experimentalists from the denial of Centrality. This is why I included Williamson as one of
the main proponents of the anti-Centrality response.
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Chapter 2
How Exceptional is Philosophy?

This chapter examines two arguments provided by proponents of the anti-Centrality
response: the “argument from linguistic practice” and the “argument from cognitive
capacities.” After describing the two arguments (Section 1 and Section 2), I will
discuss a common objection involving a distinction between “thick” notions and
“thin” notions of intuition (Section 3). The most obvious response available to antiCentrality people is to maintain that Centrality is useful to experimentalists only
when it is true as a form of philosophical exceptionalism (Section 4). As a response,
I contend that, though a “skeptical” version of the experimental critique does assume
that philosophers distinctively make use of intuitions (Section 5), more moderate
versions do not depend on this assumption (Section 6). According to the moderate
interpretations, experimentalists can appeal to several other claims, instead of
Centrality, as forms of philosophical exceptionalism; alternatively, they might turn to
a position that doesn’t need philosophical exceptionalism at all.

1. The Argument from Linguistic Practice
One natural approach to back up Centrality is to allege that intuition plays an
evidential role because philosophers frequently use “intuition” and similar terms (e.g.,
“intuitively,” “seems,” and “apparently”) in their texts. Cappelen (2012) rejects this
approach and argues for the opposite—philosophers’ linguistic practice involving
“intuition”-terminology seldom supports Centrality. This isn’t a knock-down
argument against Centrality; for even if philosophers’ “intuition” talk doesn’t
indicate a reliance on intuition, there might still be an implicit reliance. Yet, it does
7

pose a challenge to Centrality’s defenders, since the argument, if true, would
undermine an obvious reason for endorsing Centrality. Call this argument by
Cappelen the “argument from linguistic practice.” Note that Cappelen does give
some arguments against the view that philosophers implicitly make use of intuitions.
I won’t cover them in the current chapter, for I will primarily deal with the main
argument among them—the “argument from reasoning”—in Chapter 3.
Cappelen starts from the observation that there is a sharp difference in the use
of “intuition”-terminology between ordinary speakers and “intuition theorists”—
those philosophers who work on the nature and/or epistemology of intuition.
According to him, most theorists of intuition regard intuition as having at least one of
the following three features. First, intuitions always come with a special
phenomenology. This suggests the notion of intuition as “intellectual seeming”;
intuitions have their characteristic phenomenal properties just as perceptual
experiences have their characteristic phenomenal properties. Second, intuitions are
based on nothing but the conceptual competence of the subject. That is to say, one
forms an intuition about a proposition p merely on the basis of understanding p or
grasping the concepts involved in p. Third, intuitions justify, but they themselves
don’t need further justification; this implies that intuition has some fundamental
rock-bottom justificatory status.
Nevertheless, Cappelen finds that, in their everyday conversation, ordinary
speakers almost never use terms like “intuitive” and “intuitively” to refer to a mental
state with any of the above three features. They almost never use these terms to refer
to, for instance, a mental state that has to be based solely on one’s conceptual
competence. Instead, as Cappelen observes, the ordinary usage of “intuition”terminology is quite “thin.” Ordinary speakers talk of a variety of different kinds of
8

acts and entities as being intuitive, such as chess playing, music, and iPhone
operating systems. People frequently say, for example, a web application has an
“intuitive user interface.” There is almost nothing in common among all these uses,
except that there is usually “some kind of ease, effortless, or spontaneity involved”
(Cappelen, 2012, p. 33). Cappelen also makes two other interesting observations:
First, ordinary speakers often use “intuition”-terminology to express a hedge attitude
towards a judgment. They frequently say “intuitively, p” in cases where they are
unsure of the judgment that p, flagging a weaker commitment to their claim. Second,
the ordinary usage of “intuitive” and “intuitively” is context-sensitive. In particular,
“intuitive” is gradable in the sense that a proposition can be intuitive to a certain
degree. As a gradable adjective, according to Cappelen, “intuitive” is contextsensitive because whether it is true of something depends on the comparison class—
which is fixed by the context.
After noting these remarkable differences between intuition theorists and
ordinary speakers, Cappelen proceeds to discuss most philosophers’ “intuition”-talk.
On his view, the use of “intuition”-terminology by most philosophers is much more
similar to ordinary speakers’ use than to intuition theorists’. Most philosophers are
not intuition theorists; they primarily work on first-order philosophical topics rather
than metaphilosophical topics. Those philosophers normally do not have a particular
theoretical model of intuition in mind; they might not even know of the various
theories offered by intuition theorists. It is thus unlikely that their use of “intuition”terminology is radically different from the ordinary use. One might maintain that it is
possible that philosophers interested in first-order issues use “intuition” as a
technical term, even if they don’t endorse or know of any particular theory of the
term. However, Cappelen argues that “intuition” doesn’t share the features of a
9

typical technical term. Among intuition theorists, there is little consensus as to what
intuitions are, how to define intuition, or what the paradigm cases of intuition are. As
a result, there is also no unified subcommunity of experts for a user of “intuition” to
defer to. Yet, according to Cappelen, for a technical term, there is usually (i) a clear
definition, (ii) some agreed upon paradigms, or (iii) a unified subcommunity of
experts to defer to. He then infers that most philosophers use “intuition”-terminology
in a non-technical manner; hence, they use “intuition”-terminology just with their
ordinary English meanings.6 Just as ordinary speakers, most philosophers rarely use
“intuition”-terminology to speak of the mental state that most intuition theorists use
“intuition” to denote. Given that defenders of Centrality take intuition to have the
features that intuition theorists usually take it to have, Cappelen concludes that most
philosophers’ “intuition”-talk does not give any support to Centrality.

2. The Argument from Cognitive Capacities
While the argument from linguistic practice focuses on what philosophers say in
their texts, the “argument from cognitive capacities” examines how philosophers
think in making a judgment. Williamson provides such an argument against
Centrality in his book The Philosophy of Philosophy (2007). Consider a “stopped
clock” type of Gettier case: Alice sees and believes that a 12-hour clock reads two
o’clock, but, unbeknownst to Alice, the clock stopped working twelve hours ago.
What are the important cognitive capacities underlying the thought-experimental
judgment that Alice doesn’t know that it is two o’clock? Williamson contends that
there are at least two interrelated kinds of capacities involved: those concerning

6

See Bengson (2014) for an objection to this step of inference. Bengson maintains that one can use
“intuition”-terminology in a way differing both from the technical use and from the ordinary use.
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evaluation of counterfactuals and those concerning application of concepts. Neither
of these is obviously equivalent to “intuition” as used by intuition-theorists.
The judgment made in the Gettier case, according to Williamson, is a
counterfactual judgment. It has as its content the counterfactual conditional that “if a
thinker were Gettier-related to a proposition, he/she would have justified true belief
in it without knowledge” (Williamson, 2007, p. 195). To refute the JTB theory,
philosophers also need another proposition concerning modality, namely the
proposition that it is possible for a thinker to be Gettier-related to a proposition. On
Williamson’s view, however, the epistemology of modality “is simply a special case
of the epistemology of counterfactual thinking” (2007, p. 178). Counterfactuals thus
have a central position in his account of philosophical thought experiments. As
Williamson argues, the psychological mechanisms underlying counterfactual
judgments can involve a broad range of cognitive processes including imagination,
reasoning, prediction, etc. Indeed, he claims that “our capacity to evaluate
counterfactuals recruits all our cognitive capacities to evaluate sentences” and that
“there is no uniform epistemology of counterfactual conditionals” (2007, p. 152).
Though counterfactual reasoning plays a central role in thought experiments,
Williamson does not regard it as essential in some examples, e.g., the Gettier case.
He notes that there is nothing to prevent an imaginary Gettier case from being
realized in the actual world. Our judgments in response to a real-life stopped clock
case plausibly do not depend on any counterfactual thinking; still, the real-life case
has almost the same degree of philosophical significance as the hypothetical one.
This implies that there are some philosophically important mental capacities that are
applied both in the hypothetical and in the actual Gettier cases. Williamson holds that
such capacities concern applications of concepts.
11

Williamson seems to think that, once one understands the intricate nature of
philosophical thinking, one can see that intuition doesn’t possess any distinctive
status in philosophical inquiry. On his view, the judgment that Alice doesn’t know in
the Gettier scenario stems from broadly the same kind of psychological mechanisms
as those underlying everyday counterfactual judgments. He states that the
epistemology of counterfactuals in philosophy requires “no dedicated faculty of
intuition” (2007, p. 178); it is merely an application of the epistemology of
counterfactuals in general. Similar things can be said about capacities concerning
applications of concepts—they are simply broadly the same kind of capacities
involved in ordinary conceptual applications. So Centrality is inaccurate because it
fails to characterize the domain-general character of philosophical cognition. Further,
the psychological basis of thought-experimental judgments, according to Williamson,
is far more complex than “the brute simplicity which the term ‘intuition’ may
suggest,” for one usually uses the term to “pick out a special psychological or
epistemological kind” (2007, p. 216). While intuition is often used to refer to a
homogeneous psychological kind, philosophical judgments are made on the basis of
various and heterogeneous psychological processes.7 Centrality is therefore
inaccurate again, because it fails to capture the heterogeneous feature of
philosophical cognition. In a nutshell, Williamson seems to suggest that, because
intuition (in the sense of a simple, homogeneous psychological kind) has no
significant psychological role in thought experiments, it has no significant
epistemological status in thought experiments either.
Some theorists of intuition hold that intuitions are just those judgments formed
solely on the basis of conceptual competence. Now one might think that their notion
7

See Nado (2014) for a defense of the heterogeneous view of intuition.
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of “conceptual competence” is simply what Williamson considers to be capacities of
conceptual application. One might thus infer that, since intuition is the very judgment
based on the important psychological capacities underlying philosophical thinking, it
still has a central role in philosophical methodology. However, it is important to
distinguish conceptual competence from what Williamson thinks of as capacities to
apply concepts. For intuition theorists like Bealer (1998), Ludwig (2007), and
Grundman (2010), conceptual competence usually denotes the abilities involved in
the mere grasping, possessing, or understanding of the relevant concepts. The notion
is typically used to ground non-empirical or a priori knowledge in a certain sense. By
contrast, Williamson is concerned with a much wider class of capacities. He claims
that the applications of concepts are not “especially intimately connected to grasp of
the relevant concepts” (2007, p. 216). Those who fail to correctly apply the concepts
might as well grasp all the concepts involved; instead, “what they lack is a skill in
applying those concepts which goes beyond mere possession” (Williamson, 2007, p.
216). Williamson also rejects the idea that concept application skills are nonempirical or a priori. The distinction between a priori and a posteriori, he argues, is
“too rude to be of much epistemological use” (2007, p. 169).

3. The Objection from Thinness
This section examines a common line of objection to the above two arguments
against Centrality. Some philosophers have drawn a distinction between “thin” and
“thick” notions of intuition. According to Weinberg and Alexander (2014), for
instance, the “thin” conceptions “identify intuitions as merely instances of some
fairly generic and epistemological uncontroversial category of mental states or
episodes,” while the “thick” conceptions “add to this thin base certain semantic,
13

phenomenological, etiological, or methodological conditions” (p. 189). Assuming
something like this distinction, several philosophers (e.g., Chalmers, 2014; Weinberg,
2014; Weatherson, 2014) have responded to Cappelen by claiming that his argument
is too theory-laden; he assumes an overly thick theory of intuition.8 The three
intuition features he examines—having a distinctive phenomenology, being based
solely on conceptual competence, and providing fundamental justification—are true
of intuition only according to some thick notions of intuition. By contrast, the
versions of Centrality that assume thin notions of intuition remain untouched.
The following are some thin views of intuition. Gopnik and Schwitzgebel
(1998) define intuition as any judgment that “is not made on the basis of some kind
of explicit reasoning process that a person can consciously observe” (p. 77). Devitt
(2012) endorses a similar view, according to which intuitions are immediate and
unreflective judgments but not based on any conscious reasoning. Intuitive
judgments, according to Devitt, are “empirical theory-laden central-processor
responses to phenomena” (2012, p. 25). As another example, Nagel (2012) borrows
Mercier and Sperber’s (2009) distinction between the intuitive and the reflective. On
this view, intuitive judgments are caused by “processes that take place inside
individuals without being controlled by them” (Mercier & Sperber, 2009, p. 153).
Finally, assuming a dual process theory of cognition, De Cruz (2014) claims that
intuitions are just “typical outputs of Type 1 cognition” (p. 5). Type 1 cognition is
usually “automatic, fluent, and effortless,” while Type 2 cognition is usually “shower,
less fluent, deliberate, and effortful” (De Cruz, 2014, p. 5). None of the above
accounts requires intuition to have any of the three intuition features discussed by

8

Their objections mainly concern Cappelen’s argument against what he calls the “argument from
philosophical practice”; by contrast, my focus in this section is mainly on his argument from linguistic
practice.
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Cappelen (e.g., to have a special phenomenology). This contradicts his assumption
that most intuition theorists grant intuition at least one of those three features.
The above views of intuition are “thin” in two senses. First, they do not rely on
theoretically heavy notions like unique phenomenology, conceptual competence, and
fundamental justification. A variety of different theories have been proposed to
understand, say, conceptual competence, but all these theories remain highly
controversial. One’s understanding of conceptual competence can vary significantly
depending on one’s theoretical commitment. Second, the thin views use “intuition”
to refer to a more general psychological kind than the thick views. Results of Type 1
cognition, for instance, can involve a number of various and heterogeneous beliefs
and judgments. There is empirical evidence showing that the so-called Type 1
cognition actually consists of “multiple kinds of type 1 processes” (Evans, 2008, p.
271). By contrast, the thick notions denote a much narrower psychological kind. For
example, one might wonder whether there is even one single psychological state that
is based on nothing but one’s conceptual competence.
Once we appeal to some thin conception of intuition, it remains plausible that
ordinary speakers at least sometimes use “intuitive” and “intuitively” to describe this
sort of mental state. For example, intuition being immediate and unreflective
judgment is a quite everyday notion. The thin accounts also fit in well with
Cappelen’s observations about the ordinary usage of “intuition”-terminology.
Consider the notion of intuition as typical outputs of Type 1 cognitive processes—
the cognitive processes that are fast, automatic, and unreflective. As De Cruz (2014,
p. 5) notes, this notion explains well why Cappelen observes a kind of “ease,
effortlessness, or spontaneity” in ordinary speakers’ “intuition”-talk. It can also
explain why “intuition”-terminology is frequently used to express a hedge attitude: It
15

is natural to be cautious about one’s judgment if one arrives at the judgment in an
automatic and effortless manner. Further, since an actual judgment can depend more
or less on Type 1 cognition, it can be more or less intuitive too—this explains why
Cappelen finds “intuition” gradable and context-sensitive in its everyday usage.
Hence, we can agree with Cappelen that most philosophers use “intuition” just in the
ways ordinary speakers use it, while maintaining that philosophers’ “intuition”-talk
does give support to the thin forms of Centrality.
I think we could give a similar objection to Williamson’s argument from
cognitive capacities. Remember that Williamson seems to hold that Centrality is
unable to characterize the domain-general feature and the heterogeneous feature of
philosophical cognition. While some thick versions of Centrality might not be able to
capture these two features, thin versions of Centrality can. As Evans (2008) argues,
the so-called “Type 1 cognition” is actually based on a heterogeneous kind of
cognitive processes. Also, although Type 1 cognition is standardly characterized as
being domain-specific in the sense of being contextualized, we can agree that it is
“domain-general” in the following sense: There is no principled distinction between
the psychological capacities underlying Type 1 cognition in philosophy and those
underlying Type 1 cognition in everyday contexts. If we take intuitions to be typical
outputs of Type 1 cognition, then it is unsurprising that mental capacities concerning
evaluating counterfactuals and applying concepts play crucial roles in forming an
intuitive judgment. With a thin account of intuition, we don’t need to assume any
“dedicated faculty of intuition” or use intuition to pick out “a special psychological
or epistemological kind.” We could thus maintain that intuition occupies a central
psychological role as well as a central epistemological role behind philosophical
thinking. To summarize, both the argument from linguistic practice and the argument
16

from cognitive capacities assume some thick conception of intuition. If we adopt
some thin conception of intuition, however, Centrality remains a plausible thesis.
Call this the “objection from thinness.”

4. Centrality and Philosophical Exceptionalism
In this section, I shall outline the most obvious way in which critics of Centrality
might respond to the objection from thinness. The response will be related to the
thesis of philosophical exceptionalism. As I’ll use the term, philosophical
exceptionalism is the claim that there are deep methodological differences between
philosophy and other disciplines. Proponents of the anti-Centrality response might
argue that experimentalists need to assume some sort of philosophical
exceptionalism. Note that experimentalists are different from what we might call
“global skeptics,” who deem it impossible to achieve knowledge in any field of
inquiry; the experimentalists’ worry is specific for philosophical inquiry. They have
no intention to raise an objection against other disciplines such as mathematics,
physics, chemistry, and biology. Indeed, since their own work is typically based on
methods borrowed from experimental psychology or cognitive science, they cannot
be as skeptical about the standard method of those areas as they are about
philosophical method. If experimentalists want to avoid both global skepticism and
the potential self-defeat problem, then they need the assumption that philosophical
method has its own unique features which give reason for concern.
Philosophical exceptionalism claims that there are deep methodological
differences between philosophy and other disciplines. What does this exactly mean?
Several points:
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1. The claim only concerns methodological differences between philosophy
and other disciplines. Methodology refers to the established procedure of conducting
intellectual activities in a discipline; it should be distinguished from other aspects of
the discipline, such as its subject matter, goal, and progress9. This doesn’t mean that
those aspects are irrelevant to debates about methodology. Differences in subject
matter, goal, and progress between philosophy and other disciplines might give rise
to methodological differences, thus indirectly supporting philosophical
exceptionalism.
2. The expression “other disciplines” invites scrutiny. One might naturally ask
whether it refers to all disciplines except for philosophy, or merely some specific
disciplines. I take it that philosophical exceptionalism is true as long as philosophical
methodology is deeply different from the standard methodology of some legitimate
academic disciplines. Though there are deep methodological differences between
philosophy and illegitimate disciplines like astrology and alchemy, they will not
suffice to back up the assumption that experimentalists need. Typically, the relevant
disciplines are what experimentalists regard as instances of good inquiry (e.g.,
empirical sciences).10
3. The claim says that there are deep methodological differences, but how deep
is enough? As a potential premise in the experimental critique, the claim should
make it at least initially plausible that the differences can lead to a methodological
deficiency only in philosophy but not in the other relevant disciplines. For instance,
if philosophy were mostly done on Tuesdays but psychology were mostly done on
9

The term “philosophical exceptionalism” might be used to refer to deep differences in those aspects,
but this is not the version of exceptionalism that I intend to target.
10
In discussions about philosophical exceptionalism, empirical sciences are usually taken as the
exemplars of good inquiry. But one can choose other exemplars as well, such as mathematics and
logic. Ichikawa and Jarvis (2013), for example, argue against philosophical exceptionalism by
claiming that philosophical inquiry is continuous with other instances of “pure rational thinking.”
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Wednesdays, then this would hardly constitute an even initially plausible reason to
criticize only philosophy. In contrast, if philosophy were primarily done a priori but
psychology were primarily done a posteriori, then, given the experimentalists’
findings, it would be at least initially plausible that only philosophy is in trouble.
Note that some forms of philosophical exceptionalism, even if true, might not
ultimately favor the experimentalists’ position; they only make the experimental
critique initially plausible.
4. The claim seems to assume that there is some unified methodology of
philosophy, but that is not what I have in mind. Philosophical methodology can
involve a motley of different procedures. It is assumed here, however, that one or
some of those procedures are standard or central in philosophy, and the relevant
methodological differences are between those standard procedure(s) of philosophy
and the standard procedure(s) of other disciplines.
In the face of the objection of thinness, an opponent of Centrality like
Cappelen might reply that, though thin notions of intuition make Centrality true, they
don’t make it true as a form of philosophical exceptionalism—philosophers don’t
distinctively rely on intuitions as evidence. But if so, then the experimentalists’
argument cannot work. Given that both philosophy and other legitimate disciplines
involve reliance on intuition, it might be suggested, the experimental critique will
inevitably be generalized to the areas that experimentalists don’t intend to attack.11
In fact, Cappelen’s real target is not Centrality as such, but the view that
Centrality is true as an instance of philosophical exceptionalism.12 He writes that,

11

Williamson (2007) argues along broadly similar lines in his refutation of “judgment skepticism”.
It is also worth noting that one main theme of Williamson’s (2007) book is to reveal the
“unexceptional feature of philosophy” (p. 4).
12
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The targets in this work are those philosophers who endorse Centrality
and construe it as an instance of philosophical exceptionalism (or at least
exceptionalism about disciplines traditionally thought to be a priori). As
a result, it will turn out to be crucial when evaluating an argument for the
significance of intuitions to keep track of its scope. An argument that
shows that all intellectual activity relies on intuitions as evidence, and
then derives Centrality as a corollary, will not be acceptable given how
Centrality is presented by its proponents. (2012, p. 16)
It’s clear that Cappelen would reply to the objection from thinness by noting that the
experimentalists’ argument depends not just on Centrality, but on the exceptionalist
interpretation of Centrality. We might thus have a more charitable answer to the
question of why Cappelen examines only the intuition features presumed by the thick
accounts: He takes it that the thin notions of intuition are applied in “all intellectual
activity” and therefore won’t be helpful anyway for those who understand Centrality
as a sort of philosophical exceptionalism. Indeed, if the thin accounts of intuition are
correct, then reliance on intuition won’t be unique to philosophy. For instance,
immediate and unreflective judgment refers to a broad kind of mental state, and it
seems to play important evidential roles in almost every field of inquiry. Even in
scientific papers, it is not the case that every thought defended is deliberate; scientists
routinely provide uncertain hypotheses and suppositions, which serve as a basis of
reasoning but are not reflective in their nature. Even if there are deep methodological
differences between the disciplines, it is unlikely that philosophy involves much less
reflection and deliberation than empirical sciences. As another example, consider the
definition of intuition as typical outputs of Type 1 cognition. Type 1 cognition covers
highly generalized kinds of mental processes, and any academic disciplines—no
matter philosophy or empirical sciences—depend on a combination of Type 1 and
Type 2 cognitive processes.
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I agree that Centrality in the thin sense is of no use to those philosophers who
aim to construe it as an exceptional feature of philosophy. However, contra Cappelen,
I don’t think that experimentalists need to construe Centrality in this way. As I will
argue in the next two sections, while a “skeptical” interpretation of the experimental
critique does assume Centrality as a form of philosophical exceptionalism, this is not
true of more moderate interpretations of the critique. More moderate
experimentalists can either appeal to other forms of philosophical exceptionalism, or
develop a criticism without reliance on philosophical exceptionalism at all.

5. The Skeptical Interpretation of the Experimental Critique
Experimentalists have collected survey data which are purported to show that
philosophical intuitions vary according to irrelevant factors such as cultural
background, personality, and order. They generally regard such variation among
intuition as presenting a serious challenge to the long-established intuition-based
methodology of philosophy; nevertheless, they are sometimes equivocal about what
exactly the challenge is and what precise methodological lessons one should learn
from their survey data. For example, in their classic paper, Weinberg et al. (2001)
report that, while Western subjects do generally share philosophers’ intuition about
the Gettier case, among East Asian subjects more people attribute knowledge to the
protagonist in the case than not. Weinberg et al. use their data to support the
hypothesis that epistemic intuitions vary from culture and culture. They take it that,
if the variation hypothesis turns out to be true, then it will constitute a serious
difficulty for the methodology underlying several central epistemological projects.
However, their argumentation is underspecified at three levels: First, the
variation hypothesis itself is unclear, for it doesn’t specify what degree of variation is
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worrisome. Does the hypothesis suggest that epistemic intuitions are generally
variable, or that only some particular intuitions are? Second, it is unclear for what
exact reasons intuition variation leads to negative methodological consequences.
There are several different ways for intuition variation to be problematic: One can
argue that intuition is unsuitable as evidence in philosophy due to its fallibility,
unreliability, unexpected sensitivity, or something else. But Weinberg et al. didn’t
state which specific property of intuition is the methodologically detrimental one.
Third, it remains unclear how philosophers should react to the variation hypothesis.
Should they eliminate the use of intuition in theorizing, or continue using intuition
but with more care? In another early paper by experimentalists, Machery et al. (2004)
also didn’t clearly identify what precisely is wrong with intuition variation or how
we should react to the problem. This pattern of argumentation is familiar, especially
in early experimental philosophical work. The conclusion of the experimental
critique is thus open to interpretation.
According to a natural interpretation, experimentalists are skeptical about
intuition’s evidential efficacy; widespread intuitive disagreements suggest that
intuition is too unreliable to be a legitimate source of evidence.13 It is then inferred
that the use of intuition should be completely removed from philosophical practice. I
will call this the “skeptical interpretation” of the experimental critique. According to
Liao (2008), for example, experimentalists deny that “there are intuitions to which
we can sometimes appeal” (p. 254) and think that “we need to abandon the use of
intuition altogether” (p. 256). Also, Alexander and Weinberg (2007) suggest that, for
some experimental philosophers, “experimental evidence seems to point to the

13

Note that one can have a skeptical stance on intuition that does not invoke unreliability. For
example, Cummins (1998) defends intuition skepticism by arguing that intuition cannot both have
independent calibration and remain useful.
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unsuitability of intuitions to serve as evidence at all” (p. 63). And Chudnoff (2013)
claims that one aim of experimental philosophy is to argue for “skepticism about
intuition,” which is the view that “intuition experiences do not justify us in believing
propositions” (p. 98).14
If the skeptical interpretation of the experimental critique is correct, then
philosophers should remove intuition from their toolbox. It follows that, not only
philosophy, but all disciplines using intuitions as significant evidence should
radically change their methodology. On the skeptical interpretation, experimentalists
are thus assuming the following version of philosophical exceptionalism:
(E1) Intuitions are given central evidential roles in philosophy but not in
legitimate disciplines (e.g., empirical sciences).
Note that (E1) is just Centrality when it is taken as an instance of philosophical
exceptionalism. Therefore, those experimentalists who embrace the skeptical
interpretation cannot adopt the thin notions of intuition, which wouldn’t vindicate
(E1). Consequently, they cannot appeal to the objection from thinness in reply to the
two arguments made by deniers of Centrality.

6. Moderate Interpretations of the Experimental Critique
(E1) is not the only form of philosophical exceptionalism that experimentalists can
appeal to. In this section, I will survey some more recent interpretations of the
experimental critique. As will be seen, many experimental philosophers have shifted
14

It is worth noting that, though the skeptical interpretation is commonly made, it gains little support
from textual evidence. Experimentalists rarely explicitly endorse a complete rejection of intuition.
Rather, they usually overtly challenge merely a specific kind of intuition, such as epistemic intuition
or semantic intuition. That being said, some early work by experimentalists (e.g., Weinberg et al.
2001; Machery et al. 2004) might be easily read as tacitly suggesting a rejection of intuition across the
board. In any case, the skeptical reading has become an influential one, especially among critics of
experimental philosophy.
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to more moderate positions towards standard philosophical methodology. Once we
give up the skeptical interpretation of the experimental critique, experimentalists
don’t need to assume that philosophers distinctively use intuition. Rather, they can
put forward other particular forms of philosophical exceptionalism; in fact, they can
even adopt a very moderate view which doesn’t need to assume philosophical
exceptionalism at all.
Some experimentalists have distinguished their argument from intuition
skepticism. They grant that intuition is in general reliable as a source of evidence, in
the sense that it on average provides a high ratio of true to false results. Their worry
is not with intuition as a general class, but with the particular intuitions that
philosophers grant important evidential status to. As an example, Alexander and
Weinberg (2007) suggest that experimentalists can adopt the “restrictionist” position.
The restrictionist targets merely “the peculiar and esoteric intuitions that are the
philosopher’s stock-in-trade,” which “represent a fairly small portion of the entire
human intuitive capacity” (Alexander & Weinberg, 2007, p. 71). According to
Alexander and Weinberg, even if intuition is on balance accurate, it can still be the
case that “philosophers’ intuitions about typical philosophical hypothetical cases”
(2007, p. 71) are unreliable. That is to say, the subset of intuitions that philosophers
actually appeal to is inaccurate. On their interpretation, experimentalists assume the
following version of philosophical exceptionalism:
(E2) Intuitions about typical philosophical hypothetical cases are
unreliable, but intuitions used in legitimate disciplines (e.g., empirical
sciences) are reliable.
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Machery (2011) adopts a similar position in response to Williamson’s argument from
cognitive capacities. Williamson holds that there is no principled distinction between
capacities underlying philosophical cognition and everyday cognition. Machery
responds that, even if Williamson is correct, we still have good reasons to believe
that philosophers’ use of the relevant psychological capacities is beyond their proper
domain. The reason is that typical philosophical hypothetical cases have some unique
features. First, philosophical thought experiments usually “describe fanciful
situations that are very remote from the situations that elicit everyday judgments”
(Machery, 2011, p. 202). Second, philosophical cases typically “pull apart the
features that go together in everyday life” (Machery, 2011, p. 203). Third, the
situations are standardly “described in vivid terms” (Machery, 2011, p. 203). All
these features constitute general reasons to suspect the reliability of intuitions about
philosophical cases: In general, intuitive judgments are more susceptible to bias
when the subject is unfamiliar with the case or when irrelevant narrative details are
provided. Machery concludes that, without further information, we currently ought
not to trust the reliability of intuitions about philosophical cases.
Weinberg (2007) has also provided a non-skeptical interpretation of the
challenge from experimentalists. While Machery attacks the intuitions that
philosophers rely on, Weinberg attacks the trustworthiness of a particular practice:
“the current analytic philosophical practice of appealing to intuitions as evidence for
philosophical claims” (2007, p. 320). Further, while Machery focuses on the
unreliability of intuitions, Weinberg contends that the real problem is the lack of
corrigibility, or what he calls “hopefulness”, in the philosophical practice of
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employing intuition.15 That is to say, philosophers are short of appropriate methods
to identify and correct errors in their practices. In particular, experimentalists’ survey
results indicate that intuitive responses to influential thought experiments can
unexpectedly vary depending on irrelevant factors like cultural background.
According to Weinberg, this strongly suggests that we overall have little knowledge
about when people will agree or disagree in their intuitions; we are thus not in a
position to use degree of intersubjective agreement as a guide to detection of errors.
After arguing that its errors cannot be properly mitigated by other methods like
external corroboration, Weinberg concludes that the philosophical practice of using
intuition lacks corrigibility and is thus untrustworthy.
But if intuition is also used in everyday life and disciplines other than
philosophy, why are only philosophical practices involving intuitions hopeless?
Weinberg answers by noting the peculiarity of philosophical thought experiments.
Similar to Machery, Weinberg states that philosophers frequently rely on intuitions
about hypothetical cases, but usually “set no constraints on how esoteric, unusual,
far-fetched, or generally outlandish any given case may be” (2007, p. 321). Weinberg
seems to think that, because people are much less susceptible to bias and more prone
to agreement on ordinary intuitions than on intuitions concerning far-fetched
imaginary scenarios, intersubjective agreement can better mitigate errors in ordinary
appeals to intuition than in philosophical appeals. In effect, Weinberg endorses the
following form of philosophical exceptionalism:

15

In another paper, Alexander and Weinberg (2014) suggest that there is an ambiguity about
“reliable”: it can be used as a synonym for either “trustworthy” or “highly predictable.” With this
more precise terminology, we can say that Machery’s argument invokes the sense of reliability as
being highly predictable, while Weinberg’s 2007 approach concerns the trustworthy sense of
reliability.
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(E3) Philosophers’ appeals to intuitions about hypothetical cases are
hopeless, but appeals to intuitions in legitimate disciplines (e.g.,
empirical sciences) are hopeful.
A related but different interpretation of the experimental critique concerns not the
lack of error detection, but the error-fragility in philosophical practices. In a recent
paper, Alexander and Weinberg (2014) claim that philosophers’ inferential practices
are highly error-fragile; their inferences are not tolerant enough of errors in the
premises. Alexander and Weinberg complain that philosophers have put too high a
stake on specific-case intuitions; in particular, they routinely allow counterexamples
to trump general theories. As a consequence, even a fairly small number of errors in
intuitions can cast doubt on the trustworthiness of philosophers’ inferences. Nado
(2015) presents a similar reinterpretation of the experimental critique. She argues
that philosophical practices are highly epistemically demanding; philosophical
theory-building will considerably intensify the fallibility of intuition. For example,
nearly all contemporary theories of knowledge assume the standard Gettier intuition.
Therefore, even if two groups of philosophers disagree only in intuition about the
Gettier case, they will still probably produce radically different theories of
knowledge, at least if they make inferences in ways similar to standard epistemology.
This suggests that experimentalists might explicate philosophical exceptionalism as
follows:
(E4) Philosophical practices involving intuitions are highly errorfragile/epistemically demanding, but practices involving intuitions in
legitimate disciplines (e.g., empirical sciences) are not.
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All above non-skeptical interpretations of the experimentalists’ argument advocate
radical revisions in standard philosophical methodology. These positions are more
moderate than the skeptical interpretation; they suggest that philosophers’
employment of intuition should be considerably restricted rather than totally
removed. Because experimentalists presumably do not intend to advocate similarly
radical changes in other disciplines, they still need to make a sharp contrast between
philosophy and disciplines like empirical sciences. However, an even more moderate
interpretation of the experimental critique might work without philosophical
exceptionalism at all. Stich and Tobia (forthcoming), for example, put it in the
following way:
The skepticism about the use of intuitions… should be directed primarily
at intuitions that have been shown to be susceptible to irrelevant
influences, and at other intuitions that are the product of psychological
mechanisms that are likely to be vulnerable in similar ways.
The proposal here understands the experimental critique as aiming at locally
restricting those types of intuition that have already been experimentally tested. On
this view, experimental work is necessary in philosophy, even if the experimental
critique doesn’t guarantee any global shift in philosophical methodology. Consider
Weinberg et al.’s (2001) cross-cultural study of the Gettier intuition as an example.
The study alone might not suffice to indicate any general problem with epistemic
intuitions; however, it presents evidence for the view that intuition about the Gettier
case is sensitive to irrelevant factors. One might then infer that we shouldn’t trust
philosophers’ use of intuition about the Gettier case. This conclusion is much more
moderate than what previous interpretations of the experimentalists’ argument led to;
however, its philosophical significance cannot be overlooked. Given the heavy
weight the Gettier case has in contemporary epistemological debates, one might
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think that giving up the Gettier intuition by itself already constitutes an important
change in methodology.
Further, variation in the Gettier intuition raises the question of whether other
intuitions are generated by the same sort of psychological mechanisms and are
unexpectedly variable for the same reasons. We cannot answer this question,
however, without engaging with more experimental work. Stich and Tobia
(forthcoming) conclude that experimental philosophy “must have a place at the table”
and “has a crucial role to play in assessing and improving philosophical
methodology.”16 Stich and Tobia’s interpretation of the experimentalists’ position
doesn’t depend on any assumption like philosophical exceptionalism, for nonphilosophical disciplines like empirical sciences are also subject to local restrictions
in their methodology, if intuitions used in those disciplines are found to be
problematic. Their position is in fact a natural consequence of philosophical
naturalism, according to which philosophical methodology should be continuous
with the methodology of natural sciences.
I have reviewed some recent approaches to understand the experimentalists’
challenge. As have been shown, (E1) is not an essential assumption in the
experimental critique. Experimentalists can appeal to some other formulations of
philosophical exceptionalism such as (E2), (E3), and (E4); alternatively, they can do
without philosophical exceptionalism at all, by endorsing local restrictions in
philosophical practices involving intuitions. I stress that my purpose in this chapter is
not to defend any particular formulation of the experimental critique; all of the nonskeptical interpretations surveyed in this section might face some further problems.

16

Nado (2015) suggests a similar approach. She claims that the experimental critique “need not even
be viewed as a threat to philosophy as a discipline”; rather, it presents “an invitation to expand and
refine our methods—to improve philosophy, rather than undermine it” (2015, p. 219).
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Instead, I only aim to show that one cannot refute the experimental critique simply
by rejecting (E1); experimentalists don’t need to assume Centrality as an exceptional
characteristic of philosophical inquiry. As a result, moderate experimentalists can
still use the objection from thinness to respond to the argument from linguistic
practice and the argument from cognitive capacities. The thin versions of Centrality
remain convincing.
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Chapter 3
Is Intuition Central in Philosophy?

This chapter defends Centrality in response to two other recent objections, which I
will refer to as the “argument from non-neutrality” and the “argument from
reasoning.” According to the argument from non-neutrality, we shouldn’t believe the
truth of Centrality because it is ill-motivated by a particular dialectical standard of
evidence. According to the argument from reasoning, philosophical practice relies on
argumentation rather than intuition as its central evidence. As will be seen, both
objections have different implications for different versions of Centrality. Though
they constitute some prima facie strong reasons to deny some particular versions of
Centrality, I shall argue, neither of them successfully undermines the version of
Centrality that experimentalists need. Along the way, I will draw some parallels
between intuition and perception.

1. Centrality and Evidence
I have been characterizing Centrality as the statement that intuition plays a central
evidential role in philosophical inquiry. In this section, I am going to elaborate this
definition by looking at recent views concerning the nature of evidence. The
philosophical literature on evidence tends to cluster around the following three
interrelated questions: What sort of things does evidence consist of? Under what
circumstances does a subject possess x as her evidence? And, under what
circumstances is x evidence for y?17 Different answers to these questions—that is,

17

See, e.g., Kelly (2008) for more about different possible ways to answer these three questions.
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different accounts of the ontology of evidence, evidence possession, and evidential
relations—will lead to different understandings of Centrality.
To start with, one major controversy among epistemologists concerns whether
evidence always consists of propositions. Some philosophers (e.g., Williamson, 2002;
Dougherty, 2011) hold that only propositions count as evidence; others adopt a
broader view, according to which evidence can at least sometimes be nonpropositional. Philosophers of the latter kind can read Centrality as the thesis that
intuitions qua mental states are used as evidence. Even if some of them might not
think of intuitions as ultimate evidence, they typically will agree that intuitions can at
least be derivative evidence.18 And the assumption of Centrality doesn’t require that
the evidential role of intuition is ultimate or foundational.19
However, for proponents of propositional views of evidence, intuitions
themselves cannot work as evidence because they are mental states rather than
propositions. They might understand Centrality as the view that the propositional
contents of intuitions are used as evidence in philosophy—though, as I will show
later, this version of Centrality is not one which supporters of the anti-Centrality
response intend to reject. Alternatively, a supporter of the propositional view of
evidence will probably understand Centrality as the thesis that philosophers’ central
evidence consists of propositions concerning intuitions, such as the proposition that
this intuition exists, occurs, or the like, instead of intuitions themselves. To the extent
that speakers talk of intuitions as evidence, propositional theorists of evidence might
18

Conee and Feldman (2008) appear to adopt such a view about intuitive evidence. They claim that
intuitive judgments about thought experiments can “gain evidence from awareness of conceptual
relations” (2008, p. 93). They seem to suggest that one’s conscious experience of conceptual relations
is ultimate evidence, but one’s intuitive judgments can work as derivative evidence.
19
By contrast, Cappelen (2012) thinks that Centrality often has this requirement, because many
metaphilosophers claim that intuitions “provide evidence for other claims without themselves
requiring evidence” (pp. 6–7). However, though thick theorists of intuition do sometimes make this
sort of claim, thin theorists of intuition can accept that its evidential status depends on more
fundamental evidence (e.g., perceptual experience).

32

take that to be merely an abbreviation. According to them, though it’s expedient and
common in ordinary language to talk of footprints, DNAs, and mental states as
evidence, evidence actually consists of propositions, such as the proposition that this
footprint exists. Dougherty (2011), for example, contends that speaking of
experiences as evidence is a kind of loose talk, which is “innocent enough unless we
take it to reveal bedrock truth” (p. 230).
Indeed, some critics of Centrality have formulated the thesis in ways which
apparently assume some propositional theory of evidence. Cappelen (2012), for
example, thinks of Centrality as suggesting that “it is A has the intuition that p that
serves as evidence” (p. 13).20 Also, according to Williamson (2007), supporters of
Centrality take it that our evidence “consists of the psychological facts to the effect
that we have intuitions with those contents” (p. 235).21 By contrast, I will take
Centrality as true if either intuitions themselves or propositions about intuitions are
philosophers’ central evidence. In either case, we might say that “philosophers use
intuitions as evidence” but only in a loose sense. Or, to put it more rigidly, we can
say that intuition plays a central evidential role.
Here is a rough definition: x plays an evidential role for a subject S in cases
where either (i) x is the evidence that S uses or (ii) whether x obtains is always
somehow intimately related to the evidence that S uses.22 I stress that this is just a
sketch of a definition, rather than a full definition of evidential-role. In particular,
there are multiple ways to spell out the notion of a “somehow intimate” relation
20

It is unclear whether this is really how Cappelen interprets Centrality, for in another place (2012, p.
14) he also says that he is neutral on whether only propositions can be evidence.
21
Some might want to distinguish between facts and propositions. Williamson (2007), however,
explicitly uses “fact” as a synonym for “true proposition” (p. 209).
22
Earlenbaugh and Molyneux (2009, pp. 91–92) offer the definition that intuition plays an evidential
role if and only if intuition is treated as evidence. My definition of evidential-role is broader than
theirs, for, on my definition, intuition has an evidential role to play in cases where what is treated as
evidence is a proposition describing an intuition instead of the intuition itself.

33

between two things. It might be defined as, for instance, some sort of truth-making
relation or causal relation. So far as I can tell, nothing in this dissertation hangs on
the exact definition of evidential-role; the provisional definition is sufficient for my
purposes. This definition is compatible with both the propositional and the nonpropositional theory of evidence. If the non-propositional theory is correct, then
intuitions can play an evidential role by themselves being the evidence that
philosophers use. But if the propositional view is correct, then intuitions can play a
key evidential role as long as philosophers use propositions describing intuitions as
their central evidence, since there is always an intimate relation between intuitions
and propositions describing those intuitions. The definition also excludes the
versions of Centrality that critics do not intend to reject, such as the “content”
reading: “many philosophical arguments treat the contents of certain intuitions as
evidence” (Deutsch, 2015, p. 36). On this reading, the absence of an intuition isn’t
always relevant to philosophical evidence, since philosophers might use the
propositional content of an intuition as evidence due to reasons having nothing to do
with the intuition itself (e.g., theoretical arguments).
It is worth noting that Cappelen (2012) also considers an alternative way to
understand Centrality: “p is the evidence and the source of that evidence is that A has
an intuition that p” (p. 13). This interpretation is added to include a view like
Bealer’s (1998), according to which intuition itself is not evidence but a source of
evidence; it is rather the propositional content of intuition that counts as evidence. I
will not focus on this interpretation, mainly because I find the notion of “source of
evidence” rather obscure. Note that, for supporters of Centrality, it is not enough for
intuition to be a merely causal source of philosophical evidence. If any distinction
between the context of discovery and the context of justification can be made in
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philosophical inquiry, then a causal source of evidence might not be granted any
important epistemological status.23 However, it’s far from obvious how to interpret
such a notion of “source of evidence” as not merely the causal source, but neither
Bealer nor Cappelen analyses the notion in further detail.
Another related debate in epistemology concerns the nature of evidence
possession. For supporters of propositional theories of evidence, it is natural to think
that, in order for e to be one’s evidence, one has to believe the truth of e. But this
might not be sufficient for evidence possession; Williamson (2002), for example,
sets a stricter requirement that e has to be part of one’s total knowledge. Williamson
develops the E = K theory of evidence, which “equates S's evidence with S's
knowledge, for every individual or community S in any possible situation” (2002, p.
185). Assuming that evidence is what justifies belief, the E = K theory entails that
“knowledge, and only knowledge, justifies belief” (Williamson, 2002, p. 185). On
the other hand, for non-propositional theories, mental states like experiences and
intuitions count as one’s evidence only if one has those mental states; but again,
merely having a mental state might not be enough for possessing it as evidence, and
therefore additional conditions (e.g., being relatively easy to bring to awareness)
might be added. Centrality, as the claim that intuition serves as philosophers’ central
evidence, seems to presume that philosophers possess intuitions (or propositions
about intuitions) as genuine evidence, but it doesn’t. Note that, if a subject possesses
x as her evidence, then x has legitimate evidential status for her. Yet, a subject can
use x as evidence even if x doesn’t have legitimate evidential status for her. For
instance, if Williamson’s E=K theory is correct, then one cannot possess the
23

Both Deutsch (2010) and Cappelen (2012, p. 230) make a similar point. I stress that a causal source
of evidence might, and probably often does, play some important evidential role or other nonevidential epistemological role in philosophical practice. The point made here is only that the causal
source is not always important when it comes to debates about methodology.
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propositional contents of any false beliefs as one’s evidence; they don’t have
legitimate evidential status because the subject doesn’t know them. However,
plausibly, one can still use them as evidence. Centrality only holds that philosophers
use intuitions as central evidence; whether they genuinely possess intuitive evidence
is a further question.
That being said, evidence possession might have a bearing on the question of
what it is for one to use x as evidence. Given the E=K theory, for example, it is
natural to think that to use x as evidence is just to treat x as if it were known. This
implies that one can only use the contents of one’s beliefs as evidence, for, plausibly,
if one doesn’t believe x then one is not treating it as a piece of knowledge.24 By
contrast, if one’s evidence is limited to a special kind of mental states, then one
might hold that only one’s mental states can be used as evidence and that to use a
mental state as evidence for one’s belief is just to “base” one’s belief on that mental
state.25 In any case, my definition of Centrality will be neutral on the issue of what
conditions one needs to satisfy in order to use something as evidence.26
Finally, Centrality implies that intuition plays strong evidential roles in the
evaluation of philosophical theories, but differing views on evidential relation will
disagree as to what exactly this means. Some have adopted Bayesian approaches,
according to which evidential relations can be put in probabilistic terms; by contrast,
some (e.g., Conee and Feldman, 2008) insist that the evidential relation is best

24

Williamson (2002) thinks the reverse is also true: if one doesn’t treat x as knowledge then one
doesn’t believe x. He thereby adopts the view that “to believe p is to treat p as if one knew p” (2002, p.
46).
25
See Neta (2011) for a variety of approaches to characterize this “basing” relation.
26
It is important to distinguish between using x as evidence and thinking of x as evidence. Though the
former notion is restricted by theories of evidential possession, the latter notion isn’t. For example,
even if the E=K theory is correct, one can still think of a mental state as evidence. There might be a
sense of “use” according to which Centrality is true as long as philosophers think of intuitions as
central evidence. But this will not be the relevant version of Centrality here; the current chapter
considers whether intuitions are used as evidence, no matter whether we are thinking of them as such.
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understood as an abductive relation. I will stay neutral on this issue, but one point
frequently made in the Bayesian context is worth highlighting, namely the distinction
between the balance and the weight of evidence. There are two senses in which a
piece of evidence x is “strong” evidence for a philosophical theory t. One can say
that the balance of the evidence is strong, in cases where x makes t a highly probable
theory. Alternatively, one can say that x has strong evidential weight, in cases where
it provides a substantial size of evidential data.27 We might therefore ask whether
Centrality is the claim that intuitions (or propositions about intuitions) are given
strong balance or weight. In my view, Centrality is false if either intuition is treated
as having rather weak balance or rather weak weight relative to the other kinds of
philosophical evidence. Intuition’s importance in philosophical practice will be
undermined, if either it only very slightly raises a philosophical theory’s probability,
or it is thought of as providing a rather small size of relevant information.28

2. The Argument from Non-Neutrality
Williamson (2007) argues against Centrality by claiming that it is ill-motivated.
According to Williamson, the idea that philosophical evidence consists of intuitions
is driven by the principle of “Evidence Neutrality,” which he defines as follows:
Whether a proposition constitutes evidence is in principle
uncontentiously decidable, in the sense that a community of inquirers
can always in principle achieve common knowledge as to whether any
given proposition constitutes evidence for the inquiry… in a debate over
a hypothesis h, proponents and opponents of h should be able to agree
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See, e.g., Joyce (2005) for more about the balance/weight distinction.
The balance/weight distinction is seldom made in debates about intuitive evidence, probably
because a traditional non-Bayesian framework of epistemology is often assumed. An exception is
Weatherson (2014), who defends Centrality by claiming that intuition provides strong but rather
fragile evidence. However, since Weatherson takes intuitive evidence to have rather weak evidential
weight, his position doesn’t vindicate Centrality, as I use the term.
28
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whether some claim p constitutes evidence without first having to settle
their differences over h itself. (2007, p. 210)29
Note that this is not the claim that evidence is always known by participants of the
debate; it is rather the claim that evidence is always in principle known, which
means that inquirers can achieve common knowledge if they overcome all the
“accidental mistakes and confusions” (Williamson, 2007, p. 210). This suggests that
evidence plays the role of neutral arbiter between rival theories: one cannot argue
from a piece of evidence which presupposes the falsity of the opponent’s position.
Take the debate between supporters of the descriptivist theory of reference and
supporters of the causal theory as an example. According to Evidence Neutrality, one
cannot reject the descriptivist theory by putting forward evidence which presupposes
the truth of the causal theory, for in that case the descriptivist will never, even in
principle, accept that piece of evidence.
To illustrate why Williamson thinks Evidence Neutrality might lead to
Centrality, consider the Gödel case, which is frequently cited as a thought
experiment against the descriptivist theory of reference. Suppose that Schmidt rather
than Gödel actually proved the incompleteness of arithmetic. Also suppose that we
only associate one description “the prover of incompleteness” with the name “Gödel.”
What evidence does this case provide? Consider the following two propositions:
(G1) “Gödel” does not refer to Schmidt.
(G0) It is intuitive that “Gödel” does not refer to Schmidt.

29

Williamson assumes in this paragraph that some propositional theory of evidence is correct. In the
current section, I will follow Williamson in this assumption. However, the assumption is essential
neither to Williamson’s argument nor to my points made in this section; similar points can be made if
one endorses a non-propositional theory of evidence.
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According to Evidence Neutrality, one cannot use (G1) as evidence against
descriptivism. The descriptivist theory entails that “Gödel” refers to Schmidt, and
therefore the descriptivist will never, even in principle, accept that (G1) is true. By
contrast, (G0) seems to be a better candidate; even the descriptivist can agree that
(G1) is intuitive, while insisting that this intuition doesn’t falsify descriptivism. The
above sort of consideration, according to Williamson, “tempts one to retreat into
identifying evidence with uncontentious propositions about psychological states”
(2007, p. 211). To satisfy Evidence Neutrality, one needs to start with premises with
which even one’s opponents might agree. And it seems that the psychological
premises describing people’s intuitions best satisfy this condition.
Williamson denies the principle of Evidence Neutrality by pointing out that
even psychological premises don’t meet its requirement. One might face an opponent
who is committed to saying that we cannot even have the intuition that “Gödel” does
not refer to Schmidt. Some radical eliminativists, for instance, will not accept that
there are intuitions at all. On their view, attributions of folk psychological mental
states like intuition are false in the consideration of researches in neurophysiology.
(G0) doesn’t comply with Evidence Neutrality, because these eliminativists will
never, even in principle, accept that (G0) is true. Williamson infers that Evidence
Neutrality is false, for the notion of Evidence as a neutral arbiter between
participants lays us “open to exploitation by ruthless opponents” (2007, p. 238). We
shouldn’t limit our evidence simply because the opponent insists “an impoverished
skeptical starting-point”; rather, we sometimes must “abandon skeptics to their fate”
(Williamson, 2007, pp. 238–239). There is thus no need to retreat into psychological
premises like (G0). Williamson concludes that “our evidence in philosophy consists
of facts, most of them non-psychological, to which we have appropriate epistemic
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access” (2007, p. 241). I will refer to Williamson’s above argument against
Centrality as the “argument from non-neutrality.”
Even if Centrality is not well-motivated, however, this doesn’t mean that it is
false. Both Alexander (2010) and Brown (2011) have responded to Williamson by
providing reasons to accept Centrality without appealing to Evidence Neutrality.
Also, Weinberg (2009) argues that the experimentalists’ challenge doesn’t need to
assume Evidence Neutrality in any event. Though I have some worries about their
arguments, I am inclined to endorse the general idea: the principle of Evidence
Neutrality is not essential to the experimental critique. My reason is this: the version
of Centrality that Evidence Neutrality initially seems to give rise to is indeed much
stronger than what experimentalists need. As Williamson puts it, Evidence Neutrality
“exerts general pressure to psychologize evidence” (2007, p. 211); since nonpsychological premises never pass the Evidence Neutrality test, supporters of
Evidence Neutrality will contend that only psychological premises play important
evidential roles in philosophy. Thus, they will conclude that only intuitions (plus
maybe some other psychological states) serve as philosophers’ central evidence. But
supporters of Centrality don’t need to stick to such a strong conclusion. Instead, they
can accept that both psychological premises and non-psychological premises are
granted central evidential status. Thinking of intuitions as constituting central
philosophical evidence doesn’t need to exclude other sorts of evidence as equally
central.
This weak version of Centrality is enough for most experimentalists’ purpose.
Those who adopt one of the moderate versions of the experimental critique usually
aim to argue that the standard philosophical methodology should be significantly
revised, and they can achieve this purpose as long as one of the central tools in
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philosophy is shown to be in trouble. Even the skeptical version of the
experimentalists’ argument is compatible with the above weak version of Centrality.
Experimentalists can accept a skeptical attitude towards intuitions, but not towards
other kinds of evidence in philosophical practice. Admittedly, experimentalists
occasionally sound as if they think that, if intuition doesn’t qualify as evidence, then
the whole discipline of philosophy is undermined. However, this sort of radical claim
is not essential to their critique, and surely their experimental data can have
important methodological implications without being able to dismiss the discipline as
a whole.
Indeed, Williamson’s two other related worries with Centrality are also only
effective against the strong version of Centrality. First, he argues that Centrality can
be “self-defeating.” Williamson seems to think that, ceteris paribus, supporters of
Centrality prefer those explanations of intuitions on which the intuitions are true to
those explanations on which the intuitions are false.30 He then questions what
justifies this preference. Even if it is justified by an intuition, it is unclear why this
particular intuition has such a special privilege that we adopt “a methodology that
assumes its truth” (Williamson, 2007, p. 236). But this problem is merely true of the
strong version of Centrality, according to which only intuitions work as
philosophical evidence. Supporters of the weak version of Centrality, by contrast,
can claim that the above preference is justified by non-psychological considerations
rather than intuitions. One might suggest that, for instance, intuitions are more likely
to be true than false as a result of evolutionary pressure. It is also worth noting that
Williamson’s self-defeating problem is nothing unique to philosophy; empirical
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Note that this argument is not intended against experimentalists, for they don’t have such a
preference. Instead, the targets of this argument are those philosophers who support Centrality and
also think that intuition has legitimate evidential status in philosophy.
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sciences face a similar problem of why, ceteris paribus, we prefer the explanations
on which the observational data come out true. This problem, however, obviously
doesn’t constitute any good reason against what we might call “P-Centrality”, the
thesis that perception plays central evidential roles in the empirical sciences. It is
thus unclear why a similar objection in the case of intuition should be considered as a
serious problem with Centrality.
This leads to another point made by Williamson, which is precisely based on
an analogy between philosophy and the sciences. He puts it as follows:
If Evidence Neutrality psychologizes evidence in philosophy, it
psychologizes it in the natural sciences too. But it is fanciful to regard
evidence in the natural sciences as consisting of psychological facts
rather than, for example, facts about the results of experiments and
measurements… The psychologization of evidence by Evidence
Neutrality should be resisted in the natural sciences; it should be resisted
in philosophy too. (2007, p. 212)
Williamson might be right that the tendency of generally psychologizing evidence
should be resisted both in the natural sciences and in philosophy. However, it is
absurd to deny that the psychological occupies at least one of the central kinds of
evidential roles in scientific practice. It remains highly plausible that perceptions or
observations play key evidential roles, and experimental data reporting extensive
observational bias are definitely relevant to the methodology of the sciences. If we
take the analogy between philosophy and the sciences seriously, then we have good
reason to believe that intuitions are granted central (though probably not the only
central) evidential status in philosophy and that the experimentalists’ results are
relevant to philosophical methodology.
To conclude, I share with Williamson the concern that experimentalists as well
as their opponents have sometimes exaggerated the importance of intuition in
42

philosophy. Philosophers, just as empirical scientists, can and have appealed to a
wide range of non-psychological evidence. However, I think Williamson goes too far
when he says that most of the evidence used in philosophy is non-psychological in its
nature. Though we don’t need to always start from intuitive evidence in
philosophical theorizing, it remains plausible that we do start from intuitive evidence
in some central types of cases. But none of the arguments considered in this section
succeeds in refuting that weaker claim.

3. The Argument from Reasoning
Another line of attack on Centrality involves the claim that philosophers use
reasoning rather than intuition in the evaluation of theories and hypotheses. Both
Deutsch (2009, 2010, 2015) and Cappelen (2012) have appealed to this approach in
refuting Centrality. In this section, I will mainly focus on Deutsch’s view. Take the
Gödel case as an example again. Remember that Williamson seems to think that
evidence offered in this case is the thought-experimental judgment (G1): “Gödel”
doesn’t refer to Schmidt. Further, he seems to suggest that philosophers don’t need to
use any further evidence to back up the premise (G1). Deutsch, by contrast, suggests
that philosophers need and have actually used further evidence—namely,
arguments—to support thought-experimental judgments like (G1).31
More specifically, he contends that Kripke presents the following arguments
for (G1) in the original presentation of the Gödel case. The first argument is based on
analogy with several real-life examples. “Einstein,” for instance, doesn’t refer to the
inventor of the atomic bomb, despite the facts that some speakers associate with

31

Deutsch agrees with Williamson that (G1) is our evidence, but insists that the evidential status of
(G1) is derived from the arguments provided.
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“Einstein” only one description “the inventor of the atomic bomb” and that Einstein
didn’t invent the atomic bomb. The second is the “immunity to error” argument. If
descriptivism is correct, then it follows that people can never make mistakes when
they assert sentences like “Gödel is the prover of incompleteness.” Since this
consequence is false, there is good reason to believe that descriptivism is false too;
however, descriptivism is “the only reason to make the opposing judgment [that
Gödel refers to Schmidt]” (Deutsch 2015, p. 110). The immunity to error argument
thereby constitutes an indirect argument for (G1). For similar reasons, Kripke’s
objections to the descriptivist theory of meaning and positive arguments for his own
causal-historical theory (or “picture”) of reference also count as indirect arguments
for the judgment that Gödel doesn’t refer to Schmidt.
According to Deutsch, none of the arguments above starts from premises
stating people’s intuitions; the premises concern facts about reference rather than
intuitions about those facts. Both Deutsch (2010, 2015) and Cappelen (2012) have
defended similar conclusions in a series of important philosophical thought
experiments, such as Gettier cases, the Truetemp case, and the Trolley case. They
both conclude that Centrality is a misconception of philosophers’ practice and that
intuition seldom, if ever, plays significant evidential roles in philosophy. Call the
above argument against Centrality the “argument from reasoning.”
Some philosophers (e.g., Ichikawa, 2013; Brogaard, 2014) have responded by
claiming that, contra Deutsch and Cappelen, arguments for the relevant thoughtexperimental judgments do depend on intuitive evidence. Even supposing Deutsch is
right that our intuition about (G1) doesn’t serve as evidence, it is sometimes
suggested, some other intuitions do and must play evidential roles at some stage of
the argumentative chain for (G1). Deutsch (2015) refers to this as the “relocation
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problem” (p. 58). In what follows, I will raise a different objection to Deutsch. In
contrast to the relocation problem, my objection doesn’t assume the strong claim that
intuition must serve as evidence in philosophical arguments; rather, it is merely
intended to show that Deutsch doesn’t provide any good argument against Centrality.
I will focus on the following point, which is central to Deutsch’s argument:
(R) Philosophical arguments seldom start from premises stating people’s
intuitions.
Here is my strategy. Instead of arguing against (R), I will claim that there are indeed
several at least prima facie strong arguments for it. But I will further contend that we
shouldn’t respond to those arguments by rejecting Centrality. The reason is as
follows. There are similar arguments for a parallel claim (P-R) in the case of
perception. Depending on what theory of evidence one has, one might respond
differently to these arguments. However, almost no philosopher in the literature of
perception responds by rejecting P-Centrality (the view that perception plays a
central evidential role in empirical sciences). It thus seems unclear why similar
arguments for (R) should motivate us to discard Centrality.
There are at least three apparently strong arguments for (R). First, philosophers
usually don’t mention “intuition” and its cognate terms in their writings. Both
Cappelen and Deutsch have emphasized this point; they examine the original texts
surrounding famous thought experiments, and observe that philosophers very
occasionally use “intuition”-language. This is actually the main reason why Deutsch
thinks (R) is correct. Admittedly, sometimes one doesn’t mention the premises in
one’s argument, such as in the case of hidden premises. However, if philosophers
often start their arguments from statements concerning intuitions, then it is unlikely
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that “intuition”-talk would happen so rarely in philosophical practice. Second, one
might worry how one could infer from a premise describing intuition to a conclusion
concerning non-psychological philosophical subject matter. Williamson (2007) raises
such a problem, claiming that there is a gap between psychological premises like (G0)
and non-psychological conclusions like (G1) and the gap “is not easily bridged” (p.
211). Third, philosophers often don’t even consider their own intuitions at the time
of philosophical writing. When one writes about the philosophy of reference, one
considers what names refer to and what the general nature of reference is; but one
seldom considers one’s intuitions about the nature of references. This seems to
suggest that they rarely hold beliefs about their own intuitions. One might not believe
one’s premises in some cases of hidden premises, but in most cases one does hold
beliefs about the premises one uses. There is thus a prima facie good reason to think
that philosophers do not use premises about intuition in their arguments at all.
No matter how strong the above arguments are for (R), it is important to note
that one can make analogous arguments for the following judgment in the case of
perception:
(P-R) Arguments in the empirical sciences seldom start from premises
stating people’s perceptual experiences.
To start with, one can defend (P-R) by claiming that scientists seldom use
“perception”-language in their academic writings. For example, Williamson (2007)
takes it that “when scientists state their evidence in their publications, they state
mainly non-psychological facts” (p. 212). One can thus argue that, if scientists
usually start from premises about experiences, then it is inexplicable that
“perception”-talk happens so rarely in scientific publications. Moreover, one can
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complain that there is a gap between the psychological and the non-psychological in
the case of perception too. Brown (2011) points out that, on some accounts of
perceptual evidence, there is a problem of how one can infer from the proposition
that “one is having an experience as of p” to the conclusion that “p is the case” (p.
506). She then responds to Williamson’s gap objection by arguing that an externalist
approach to bridging the gap in the case of perception could be well applied to the
case of intuition too. Finally, one can also contend that (P-R) is true because
empirical scientists plausibly often don’t even consider their own perceptual
experiences. This suggests that scientists seldom hold beliefs about perception, and
thus their argumentation seldom begins with the contents of those beliefs. These
reasons support (P-R) in ways similar to how the parallel reasons support (R) in the
case of intuition.
What would philosophers of perception regard as the consequences of these
prima facie strong arguments for (P-R)? I take it that few philosophers will think that,
because those arguments support (P-R), they also constitute good reasons for the
view that perceptual experiences play no central evidential roles in scientific
practices. In what follows, I will present a dilemma: no matter whether a philosopher
accepts a propositional or a non-propositional theory of evidence, they don’t reject PCentrality on the basis of the above reasons for (P-R). Take the last argument for (PR) as an example, which has been discussed frequently in recent debates about the
nature of perceptual evidence. For instance, Kelly (2014) writes that,
. . . some philosophers maintain that in typical cases of perception, one
does not form beliefs about how things appear to one, or about how one's
perceptual experience presents things as being: rather, in response to
one's experiences, one simply forms beliefs about the external world
itself.
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In a similar vein, Pollock and Cruz (1999) argue that “the beliefs we form are almost
invariably beliefs about the objective properties of physical objects—not about how
things appear to us” (p. 61). According to them, we don’t possess beliefs about our
own perceptual experiences in standard cases. One might thus allege that we rarely
argue from premises stating perceptual experiences either, for we typically hold
beliefs about our premises. This potential argument for (P-R) has exactly the same
structure as the last of the above arguments for (R).
The crucial point is that Neither Kelly nor Pollock and Cruz argue that,
because we seldom have beliefs about perception, perception has no evidential status.
Instead, they both infer that perception has an evidential role to play—it is just that
propositional theories of evidence fail to account for that role. They claim that the
propositional view is overly demanding and hyper-intellectual; for, in order to
characterize the evidential status of perception, the propositional theory requires one
to form a higher-order belief regarding one’s own perceptual experience. Indeed, (PR) contradicts P-Centrality only if one assumes some propositional theory of
evidence. But if the non-propositional view of evidence is correct, then (P-R) is in
fact compatible with P-Centrality. For, according to the non-propositional view, a
perceptual experience can be used as evidence for a premise without itself being
presented in the premise. Take Conee and Feldman’s (2004) evidentialism, which is
an influential non-propositional theory of evidence, as an example. They argue that
evidence includes “one’s private experiences” and that “such evidence could not be
put into an argument in any useful manner” (2004, pp. 2–3). On such a view, we can
accept that (P-R) is true—arguments in sciences seldom start with propositions
describing perceptions—but insist that perception plays its evidential role in some
other way.
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There seems to be nothing to prevent us from giving the same sort of reply in
the case of intuition. We can agree with Deutsch that (R) is true: philosophical
arguments rarely have their starting points as propositions presenting intuitions.
However, that is not the only way in which intuitions can play a central evidential
role. If the non-propositional view of evidence is true, then intuitions are used as
evidence for the premises in the arguments, but they themselves don’t appear in
those premises. Centrality thus remains cogent despite Deutsch’s arguments for (R),
assuming that evidence can be non-propositional in its nature.
Further, in my view, even if evidence must be propositional, the argument
from reasoning still doesn’t give any good reasons for rejecting Centrality. Consider
the case of perception again. As I said above, some philosophers cast doubt on the
propositional theory of evidence by arguments for (P-R). But importantly, even those
who support the propositional theory don’t reply by denying P-Centrality; instead,
they choose to reject (P-R) by undermining the apparently strong arguments for it.
For instance, Williamson, a proponent of the propositional theory, claims that we
usually believe “the proposition that things appear to be that way” (2002, p. 198) and
that propositions like this describe our perceptual experiences. He admits the fact
that in typical cases we don’t consider such proposition; however, according to
Williamson, we still often have beliefs and knowledge about these propositions,
because “one knows many propositions without considering them” (2002, p. 199).
One doesn’t need consideration to believe or even know a proposition, because
“knowing is a state, not an activity” (Williamson, 2002, p. 199). In other words,
while critics of the propositional theory of evidence condemn it as being hyperintellectual, Williamson maintains that beliefs about one’s own mental states are not
as hard to achieve as the critics suppose it to be. On his view, to achieve such beliefs,
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the subject doesn’t even need to grasp the notion of perception. One only needs to
grasp the notion of appearing by having “some inkling of the distinction between
appearance and reality” (Williamson, 2002, p. 199).
Again, there seems to be nothing to stop us from making a similar reply in the
case of intuition. We can respond to Deutsch by stating that, despite the fact that
philosophers usually don’t consider propositions about intuitions, they can still
possess beliefs about those propositions, because knowledge is a state but not an
activity. We might also add that, for Centrality to be true, philosophers don’t even
need to grasp the notion of intuition. They only need to grasp the notion of appearing,
since propositions like “things appear to be that way” standardly describe one’s
intuitions in philosophical contexts. And if they believe such propositions, then it
remains plausible that such propositions are hidden premises in philosophical
argumentation.
The point is basically this. Though there are some prima facie strong
arguments for (P-R), virtually no one in the literature of perceptual evidence denies
P-Centrality on the basis of these arguments, no matter whether one supports the
propositional or the non-propositional theory of evidence. Quite the opposite, it is a
crucial aim for any plausible theory of evidence to capture perception’s evidential
role. As shown by Deutsch and Cappelen, there are similar prima facie strong
reasons for accepting (R). If one reacts in ways similar to how philosophers react in
the case of perception, then one should claim that the argument from reasoning
doesn’t undermine Centrality, whatever account of evidence is correct. It is rather the
other way around: any plausible theory of evidence had better be able to take account
of intuition’s potential evidential role. Since critics of Centrality don’t give any
reason why one should react differently in the case of perception and the case of
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intuition, it remains convincing that intuition plays a central evidential role in
philosophical practice.
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Chapter 4
How Do Philosophers Use Intuitions?

I have defended Centrality in response to some recent objections in the previous two
chapters. In the current chapter, I am going to develop my own criticisms of the
experimentalists’ argument. My main target will be Weinberg’s 2007 version of the
experiment critique, though I expect that similar objections can be applied to other
moderate versions too. As I discussed in Chapter 2, Weinberg (2007) attacks the
philosophical practices surrounding use of intuition rather than intuition itself.
Though Weinberg’s approach avoids overall skepticism towards intuition, his focus
on practices raises the question of whether the judgments being studied by
experimentalists genuinely reflect philosophical practices.32 I will argue that
experimental surveys’ appeals to intuition differ from philosophers’ appeals in the
following two respects. First, experimentalists mostly investigate case intuitions, that
is, intuitions about whether a notion is applicable in a given particular case; but
philosophical practices more frequently depend on general intuitions, that is,
intuitions about the truth of a general principle or about a connection between
abstract notions.33 Second, when philosophers do treat case intuitions as evidence,
they typically provide more contextual information than what experimentalist
surveys have thus far provided. These two differences, I shall argue, undermine the
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Indeed, in his response to the “relocation problem,” Deutsch (2015, p. 125) suggests a similar line
of argument against the experimental critique. He claims that, even if philosophers ultimately rely on
intuitions as rock-bottom evidence, experimentalists don’t have actual empirical data that show that
there are some difficulties in this reliance.
33
There are multiple ways to spell out this rough distinction between the two kinds of intuition. For
example, one might distinguish them in terms of the generality of the propositional content of an
intuition or in terms of whether an intuition concerns concrete or abstract matters. So far as I can tell,
nothing in this chapter hangs on how the distinction is exactly made.

52

plausibility of Weinberg’s argument. Along the way, I will contrast my position with
the anti-Centrality response and the “expertise defense.”
I stress that my purpose is not to defend “armchair” philosophical methodology.
Indeed, if experimentalists design surveys in ways that more accurately represent
philosophical practices, they might be able to generate data favoring Weinberg’s
conclusion. I aim to show only that most current experiments are not conducted in
such ways and thereby cannot justify Weinberg’s criticism of standard philosophical
methodology.

1. Case Intuition and General Intuition
For a proponent of the skeptical approach, intuitions are treated as a single
problematic class, and therefore any study of intuition is potentially relevant. By
contrast, Weinberg’s version of the argument crucially relies on the assumption that
the practices examined in experimental surveys are representative of the
philosophical practices involving uses of intuition as evidence. Yet, I suspect that
they are fairly unrepresentative. In virtually all their survey designs, experimentalists
seek to prompt respondents’ intuitions about particular cases.34 They ask questions
like “Does Bob really know that Jill drives an American car, or does he only believe
it?” (Weinberg et al., 2001, p. 443) or measure respondents’ degree of agreement
with statements like “John decided to kill his wife of his own free will” (Feltz &
Cokely, 2009, p. 345). In contending that such investigations should motivate
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Schwitzgebel and Cushman’s (2012) study is an exception, which elicits participants’ judgments
about abstract moral principles. Yet, even in this study, specific-case judgments are still the main
focus; it includes 17 questions concerning particular scenarios but only 5 questions concerning moral
principles. There are a few more investigations on general intuitions in experimental philosophy, such
as Nichols and Knobe (2007) and Nahmias, Coates, and Kvaran (2007); nonetheless, these studies are
aimed at neither discovering intuitive bias nor developing the experimental critique.
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dramatic revisions in philosophers’ appeals to intuition, Weinberg seems to presume
that philosophical practice involves primarily reliance on specific-case intuitions.
Indeed, this assumption appears to be common in current metaphilosophical
debates. For instance, Bealer (1998) writes that “it is intuitions about concrete cases
that are accorded primary evidential weight by our standard justificatory procedure;
theoretical intuitions are by comparison given far less evidential wright” (p. 205).
Also, Jackson (1998) claims that the “only possible answer” to the question of how
we should identify our ordinary conception is by appeal to “intuitions about possible
cases” (p. 31). And Weinberg et al. (2001) even characterize an epistemic intuition as
“simply a spontaneous judgment about the epistemic properties of some specific case”
(p. 432). When it comes to a metaphilosophical problem about the use of intuition,
there is often a tendency to identify the problem as simply a problem concerning the
use of case intuition.
Nevertheless, philosophers seldom offer any reason why particular-case
intuition deserves this epistemic priority. Certainly, they have attempted to defend
the evidential efficacy of particular-case intuition; however, they seldom tell us why
particular-case intuition deserves a stronger evidential status than general intuition.
As Kagan (2001) points out, “it is far from clear what, if anything, makes it
legitimate for us to give these [case specific] intuitions the kind of priority we
typically give them” (p. 46). At present, we simply know too little about
psychological mechanisms underlying intuition to judge which kind of intuition has a
more important epistemic status. Kagan argues that, since the priority of specificcase intuition lacks justification, our practice is seriously misguided. However, I
want to draw a different conclusion. The fact that this priority is hard to justify, I
think, gives us a prima facie reason to doubt whether philosophers really give
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specific-case intuition this priority. If philosophical practice, under this interpretation,
is so obviously ungrounded, then there is a reason to carefully reconsider the
accuracy of this interpretation.35
A closer look at philosophical practice, nonetheless, reveals that the alleged
epistemic centrality of case intuitions is an exaggeration. Philosophers often grant
significant evidential roles to general intuitions—intuitions about general principles
or about connections between abstract philosophical notions. For example,
epistemologists almost universally share the intuition that knowledge requires truth,
and nearly all proposed theories of knowledge depend on this general intuition. Also,
Sosa (1980) takes the main support for “formal foundationalism” to be the intuitive
plausibility of the idea that “epistemic justification is subject to the supervenience
that characterizes normative and evaluative properties generally” (p. 15). In
philosophy of mind, Chalmers (2010) dismisses “Type-A Materialism” because it
makes a “highly counterintuitive claim” (p. 114) that consciousness does not need
further explanation once all the functions are explained. These examples could be
easily multiplied. The use of general intuition constitutes an important aspect of
philosophers’ intuition-based methodology; this aspect, however, has been
overlooked in most experimental surveys.
At this stage, Weinberg might retreat and claim that experimentalists aim to
criticize only philosophical practices involving thought experiments. It might be
suggested that, although philosophers frequently rely on general intuitions, their
thought-experimental judgments are mainly based on case intuitions. This weaker
claim, however, is still dubious. One reason to suspect it comes from the argument
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This style of argument takes its inspiration from Deutsch. Deutsch (personal communication)
argues that we don’t treat intuitions as evidence because it is so obvious that we shouldn’t treat them
as such.
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from reasoning, one of the anti-Centrality arguments I discussed in Chapter 3.
Deutsch (2009, 2010, 2015) and Cappelen (2012) suggest that thought-experimental
judgments are often supported by philosophical arguments instead of intuitions. For
example, according to Deutsch (2010), Gettier’s (1963) judgment that Smith lacks
knowledge is primarily based on arguments like the following: Smith does not know
because his belief is true due to a lucky coincidence. Both Cappelen and Deutsch go
further and claim that, since experimentalists wrongly assume that thought
experiments rely on intuitive evidence, experimental surveys have little philosophical
significance.
I am sympathetic to their idea that philosophers usually give strong evidential
weight to arguments concerning thought experiments. However, I do not endorse
their further view that thought experiments do not rely on any intuitions as evidence.
Instead, I maintain that the arguments provided in thought experiments are often
grounded in general intuitions—they start from intuitively plausible premises about
principles or about connections between abstract concepts. As both Ichikawa (2013)
and Brogaard (2014) have pointed out, supporters of the anti-Centrality response
have difficulty explaining our epistemic access to the premises of philosophical
arguments. For example, Gettier’s argument mentioned above relies on the following
premise: if one’s belief is true as a matter of luck, then one does not know. This
premise is most naturally understood as being supported by a general “anti-luck”
intuition; other possible interpretations, such as that Gettier stipulates the premise
without any evidence or that he relies on further reasons for accepting the premise
without stating them, seem uncharitable.
A further reason to believe that the anti-luck intuition has a central epistemic
status in the Gettier literature is as follows. Note that epistemologists—even those
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who defended the standard theory of knowledge as justified true belief before Gettier
published his paper—almost unanimously agree that Gettier successfully refuted the
JTB theory.36 This sudden shift of opinion seems abnormal, not least because people
commonly have a psychological tendency to disregard or underweight evidence that
could disconfirm their old views. Philosophical practices are commonly described as
involving a mutual adjustment of theories and data. If case intuitions are central
evidence for Gettier judgments, it is hard to explain why nearly every philosopher
has chosen to revise the theory rather than to revise judgments about Gettier cases.
Intuitions are typically regarded as providing merely prima facie evidence; it is
unclear why case intuitions alone were thought, in this case, to almost
uncontroversially override all the theoretical advantages (e.g., simplicity) of the JTB
account.
To explain this abnormality, I suggest that philosophers’ central justification
for their Gettier judgments comes from the general anti-luck intuition, an intuition
which epistemologists had been using even before Gettier’s paper. Importantly,
epistemologists relied on the anti-luck intuition as evidence for the justification
condition of the JTB theory. As Pritchard (2012) notes, the “standard response” (p.
247) to the question of why knowledge has to be justified is that mere true beliefs
can be formed as a result of luck. The JTB theory is bankrupt, not only because of
Gettier’s counterexamples, but because the counterexamples are novel applications
of the anti-luck intuition, which was previously thought of as a main reason for
accepting the JTB account. Since the JTB theory is undermined by the very general
intuition that was once standardly thought of as supporting it, it is to be expected that
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Weatherson (2003) is a notable exception.
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epistemologists suddenly abandoned this theory in the face of Gettier’s
counterexamples.
Another case in point is Lehrer’s (2000) “Truetemp” case against externalist
theories of knowledge. In this thought experiment, scientists insert into Mr.
Truetemp’s brain an accurate temperature recording device. The device reliably
causes him to possess and accept thoughts about the temperature, but Mr. Truetemp
himself knows neither that the device has been inserted nor that his thoughts about
the temperature are reliable. Cappelen (2012) observes that Lehrer provides several
arguments to support his judgment that Mr. Truetemp does not know what the
temperature is. The central idea of those arguments, I think, is that Mr. Truetemp
does not know because “the correctness of the thought is opaque to him” (Lehrer,
2000, p. 187). This argument relies on what I will call the “opacity principle” that, if
the correctness of a thought is opaque to a person, then she does not know the
content of that thought. That is to say, for a thought to count as knowledge, the
thinker needs to have at least some rough background information about why her
thought is correct, such as information about the underlying cognitive mechanism or
about the truth frequency of her thought processes. In the absence of any such
background information, according to Lehrer, Mr. Truetemp fails to know what the
temperature is.
Cappelen claims that the Truetemp case is not based on any intuition. Again, I
disagree with this claim, for the opacity principle is most obviously understood as
expressing a general intuition regarding the nature of knowledge. I take it that
Lehrer’s main putative evidence against externalism consists of this general intuition.
This can be seen from his reaction to modified accounts of externalism, which
exclude the Truetemp case as a case of knowledge. Lehrer responds that “the
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fundamental difficulty remains” (2000, p. 188) and then turns to another example to
illustrate this difficulty. In this example, a person is told that Mr. Haller is in her
office, yet she has no idea whether the person telling her this is reliable or not. Lehrer
then uses an argument based on the opacity principle to defend his conclusion that
the person does not know that Mr. Haller is in her office. However, the lack of
knowledge in the Mr. Haller case appears far less intuitive than it is in the Truetemp
case. Individuals trust the testimony of strangers all the time, for instance, when they
get lost and ask for directions. It thus seems unlikely that most people will deny
testimonial knowledge in the Mr. Haller case, at least if they are not already thinking
of the general opacity principle. Therefore, any intuitive plausibility of Lehrer’s
judgment about the Mr. Haller case to a great extent comes from the general intuition.
The fact that Lehrer maintains the fundamental difficulty remains in this example
strongly indicates that his argument against externalism relies more on the general
intuition about the opacity principle than on specific-case intuitions.
I have argued above that general intuitions play a substantial evidential role in
both Gettier cases and the Truetemp case. This constitutes a serious challenge to
Weinberg’s formulation of the experimental critique, for a series of influential
experimental studies on those cases (e.g., Weinberg et al., 2001; Swain et al., 2008;
Weinberg, Alexander, Gonnerman, & Reuter, 2012) all focus on intuitions about
particular cases while ignoring general intuitions. Similar emphasis on general
intuitions can be found in many other philosophical thought experiments, especially,
I think, in cases where the author refers to the case intuition as providing merely
“prima facie” evidence.
It is common for a philosopher to claim that intuition about a particular thought
experiment constitutes merely prima facie evidence, but what do they exactly mean
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by “prima facie”? The first possibility is that they mean that intuition provides a
defeasible reason for accepting the thought-experimental judgment. This is how
Pollock (1987) defines prima facie reasons:
P is a prima facie reason for S to believe Q if and only if P is a reason for
S to believe Q and there is an R such that R is logically consistent with P
but (P & R) is not a reason for S to believe Q. (p. 484)
However, I don’t think this is all what philosophers mean when they refer to a case
intuition as giving a prima facie reason. Putting logical reasons aside, one might
wonder whether there is any single type of reason that provides non-defeasible
justification. Even logical inferences might be defeasible, given the existence of nonstandard logical systems. It is thus unclear why philosophers much more frequently
refer to case intuitions as providing prima facie reasons than referring to other sorts
of evidence as being so. They much less frequently say, for instance, that an
abductive argument or an argument from analogy has prima facie justificatory status,
though such arguments are far from non-defeasible.
On an alternative interpretation, philosophers mean “weak justification” by
“prima facie justification.”37 Namely, they hold that intuition about a particular
thought experiment offers fairly weak evidential support for the thoughtexperimental judgment. This interpretation, if correct, would lead to skepticism
about the significance of negative experimental philosophy. Their data mainly
concern case intuitions; but if case intuitions are treated as fairly weak evidence, then
the philosophical importance of the experimental critique will be fairly marginal. In
any event, I take it that there is a better interpretation of philosophers’ use of “prima
facie” when they are talking about case intuitions. They mean that a case intuition
37

Deutsch (personal communication) holds this view and uses it to challenge the experimental
critique.
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provides weak evidential support for a judgment unless the judgment is grounded in
more general considerations.38 This implies that the case intuition provides easily
defeasible justification; the justification can be defeated by general considerations
supporting the opposite judgment. The general considerations, I suppose, are often
supported by our general intuitions about them. Thus, contrary to what
experimentalists assume, general intuitions are frequently given a more important
evidential status than case intuitions are.
An example is Block’s (1978) China-brain thought experiment, in which a
billion people in China communicate with one another in the ways that are
functionally equivalent to a human mind. After appealing to the intuition that the
China-brain lacks mentality, Block notes that this provides merely prima facie doubt
against functionalism. He emphasizes that he will “not rest on this appeal to intuition”
because this kind of reliance on intuition is “notoriously fallible” and “far from
decisive” (1978, p. 278). He then argues that the content of the intuition has “a
rational basis” and that this basis provides “a good reason for doubting that
Functionalim is true” (1978, p. 278). This rational basis rests on the general principle
that “mentality depends crucially on psychological and/or neurophysiological
processes and structures” (1978, p. 282). The argument goes that, since the Chinabrain need not resemble the human mind psychologically or neurophysiologically, it
need not have mentality. Therefore, there is at least one possible China-brain system
without mental states. Block maintains that the general principle is “a highly
plausible assumption” (1978, p. 282) and that the case intuition is at least partially
controlled by it. Though he doesn’t clearly specify the epistemic grounds for the
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that there are prima facie reasons to think that we seldom argue from premises stating our own
intuitions, for instance, I only mean that these reasons are defeasible.
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general principle, on a natural understanding it is supported by our general intuition
concerning mentality. As the starting point of Block’s argumentation, the Chinabrain case intuition might have a more important rhetorical role (e.g., in raising the
readers’ interest); nevertheless, it is the general intuition that plays the more
important evidential role in this thought experiment.
A final objection to the methodological centrality of case intuition is as
follows. To fully appreciate the epistemic significance of a thought experiment, it
doesn’t suffice for one to share the particular case intuition. Moreover, one usually
needs to be able to construct similar cases based on the same general rationale. Take
Jackson’s (1982) case of Mary as an example. Mary is a brilliant scientist who
obtains all the physical information about human color vision in a black and white
room. According to Jackson, after Mary is released from the room, it seems “just
obvious that she will learn something about the world and our visual experience of it”
(1982, p. 130). This original case concerns only visual experience. Yet, if one really
understands Jackson’s point, then one should be able to think of similar cases, e.g., a
similar Mary case about smell, taste, or hearing. Importantly, one should be able to
know that those similar cases present the same general line of objection to
materialism, namely, the knowledge argument.
But how do we achieve the knowledge that the cases are offering the same
general objection? We cannot know it by case intuitions alone. Also, we cannot
know it only because the cases are similar. As one can learn from the post-Gettier
literature, two cases closely resembling each other can express two very different
worries with a theory. On my view, general intuitions have a crucial role in achieving
knowledge of the above kind. The original Mary case, I think, reflects an intuitive
general principle about knowledge, and we are able to grasp that principle by
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considering the particular case. The grasp of that general principle enables us to
construct similar cases and to know that the cases are based on the same rationale.
Though the general principle can have divergent epistemic grounds, I take it that in
many cases it is mainly supported by a general intuition. Hence, to the extent that the
above kind of knowledge is philosophically important, general intuition often has a
prominent epistemic status in the use of thought experiments.
One might wonder what the relevant principle is in the Mary case. In my
view, though we might not be able to articulate what exactly the principle is, we can
put it roughly as follows: the principle that the subject will learn something new in
Mary-style cases. Intuition about this principle is what really matters in the
knowledge argument, instead of intuition about any particular Mary-style case. In
general, experimentalists have exaggerated case intuitions’ role in philosophers’ use
of intuitions. Their experimental surveys generally target unrepresentative samples of
intuitions; thus, they have in effect been testing a different sort of practice than the
one that occurs in philosophy. Note that this is a more serious problem for
Weinberg’s account than for the skeptical account. A skeptic about intuition regards
all intuitions as a class and rejects them wholesale; as a result, she can appeal to any
study of intuition for support. By contrast, Weinberg tries to reject only philosophical
uses of intuition; therefore, only studies of intuition that resemble philosophical
practices closely can lend support to his critique.
Experimentalists might reply that case intuitions and general intuitions are
generated by the same mental capacity and are thus likely to be subject to the same
biases. As a result, it might be suggested, survey data indicating biases in case
intuitions are indirect evidence for biases in general intuitions. However, the
“homogeneity” assumption that the same psychological mechanism is responsible for
63

both case intuitions and general intuitions is a substantial empirical hypothesis—one
which experimentalists have gathered little evidence for. In fact, as have been seen in
Chapter 2, there is good reason to think that intuition in the thin sense is based on a
heterogeneous kind of cognitive processes. Moreover, the few extant studies on
general intuitions in experimental philosophy seem to count against the homogeneity
assumption. For example, Schwitzgebel and Cushman (2012) report that, while the
order of presentation influences non-philosophers’ intuitions concerning particular
moral scenarios, it shows little impact on their intuitions concerning moral principles.
Further, Nichols and Knobe (2007) suggest that case intuitions about moral
responsibility are more inclined to be affected by emotion than general ones. In the
absence of evidence supporting the homogeneity assumption, we currently have no
reason to think that experimentalists’ data imply anything about philosophers’ use of
general intuitions.39 In the next section, I will argue that their data also fail to cast
doubt on philosophical practices involving case intuitions.

2. Context-Poor Intuition and Context-Rich Intuition
In the last section, I have argued that experimentalists overestimate the
methodological importance of specific-case intuitions. In spite of this, I think case
intuition still plays some evidential role in philosophical practice. At this point,
Weinberg might maintain that current experimental results should at least lead to
substantial revisions in philosophical practices involving specific-case intuitions.
However, there is still a key difference between philosophers’ and surveys’ use of
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See Nado (2014) for more psychological evidence against the homogeneity assumption. Though my
main target here is Weinberg’s interpretation of the experimentalists’ argument, it is worth noting that
the homogeneity assumption also seems to underlie the skeptical interpretation. Indeed, Nado argues
that, since intuitions are fairly heterogeneous, the entire experimentalist project of evaluating intuition
seems misguided.
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case intuitions: philosophical texts usually provide more contextual information than
experimental surveys do. Throughout this section, I will limit my discussion to
intuitions about particular cases.
To get clear on my proposal, it is useful to compare it with a recently popular
“expertise defense” of standard philosophical methodology. This defense says that
philosophers only treat as evidence intuitions of those who possess a certain degree
of philosophical training or expertise. Proponents of this approach have postulated
the existence of different types of philosophical expertise, such as being better at
understanding and interpreting descriptions of scenarios (Horvath, 2010), being
better at making judgments based solely on conceptual competence (Ludwig, 2007;
Kauppinen, 2007), or an expertise analogous to expertise in other disciplines like
physics and psychology (Devitt, 2011). They speculate that such expertise can
reduce or eliminate the cognitive biases found in experimentalists’ surveys, most of
which investigate intuitive judgments of non-experts.
In order to test this speculation about philosophical expertise, experimental
philosophers have conducted a number of surveys directly on philosophers. Contrary
to what the expertise defense predicts, philosophers are found to be no less
susceptible to intuitive bias than laypeople. Their so-called “expert” intuitions vary
dramatically according to factors like personality (Schulz, Cokely, & Feltz, 2011),
order (Schiwitzgebel & Cushman, 2012), and the subject’s linguistic background
(Vaesen, Peterson, & Van Bezooijen, 2013). Though such results are far from
decisive, they do seem to constitute a strong challenge to proponents of the expertise
defense, who have provided little experimental data in support of their thesis.
Supporters of the expertise defense allege that experimentalists’ early surveys
are mistaken in what individuals they should test. By contrast, I think the more
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serious problem for most surveys, whether of laypeople or of professional
philosophers, is that they are mistaken in what practices they should test. Note that
this is a problem especially pressing for Weinberg’s account of the experimental
critique, which is aimed at challenging the philosophical practice of using intuition,
instead of intuitions themselves. Weinberg needs to show not only that intuitions are
unstable, but that they are unstable in practices similar enough to philosophers’
appeals to intuition. However, current experimental surveys mostly generate
intuitions through vignettes that provide little contextual information, or in a
“context-poor” way; thus, they are not testing the philosophical employment of case
intuition, which typically involves more substantial contextual information, or is
“context-rich.”
By contextual information, I mean the information that philosophers provide in
the text surrounding a thought experiment.40 For instance, this can involve explicit
calling attention to a particular aspect of the scenario, reasoning about the relevant
thought-experimental judgment, or comparisons between different cases. Such
information can perform many functions; for instance, Cullen (2010) has argued that
surveys’ lack of explicit “conversational contexts” can lead to misunderstanding of
both the vignette and the question.41 In this section, I will focus on another function
of contextual information that will be particularly important for the purpose of
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That is to say, contextual information includes both what is explicitly stated and what is tacitly
implied in the text.
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There is an important difference between Cullen’s argument and mine. Cullen complains that, since
experimentalists do not apply the correct survey methodology, their findings demonstrate variations in
survey responses but not in intuitions. By contrast, I am neutral on whether experimental studies elicit
intuitions; I claim only that the practices they study are significantly different from philosophical
practices.
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evaluating Weinberg’s argument: contextual information frequently highlights the
ordinary aspects of a far-fetched imaginary scenario.42
Take Lehrer’s Truetemp case as an example again. Though this thought
experiment primarily relies on a general intuition, the independent fact that the
particular case intuition is in agreement with Lehrer’s views provides some extra
evidential support. In eliciting this case intuition, Lehrer explicitly draws readers’
attention to the fact that Mr. Truetemp “has no idea whether he or his thoughts about
the temperature are reliable” (2000, p. 187). The reasoning from the opacity principle
highlights the same fact: one main reason to believe that the correctness of the
thought is opaque to Mr. Truetemp is exactly that he does not know whether his
thoughts are reliable or trustworthy. This aspect of the case is made still more
evident in comparisons between different cases. For instance, a later appearance of
the Truetemp case in Lehrer’s book is immediately followed by an ordinary case, in
which one reads an accurate thermometer at a gas station but has no idea whether the
thermometer is trustworthy or not.43 Surveys on this thought experiment, however,
do not stress the above fact. Take Swain et al.’s (2008) Charles case, which is
modeled after the original Truetemp case, as an example. While the vignette provides
information like that “Charles is unaware that his brain has been altered” and that
“apart from his estimation, he has no other reasons to think it is 71 degrees” (Swain
et al., 2008, p. 154), it does not emphasize the specific fact that Charles has no idea
about the reliability or trustworthiness of his thoughts. This aspect of the case is
42

In fact, in a response to Cappelen, Weinberg (2014) makes a similar point that Lehrer’s arguments
work as “textual cues,” which steer us “towards what he takes to be the proper viewing conditions for
the case” (p. 552). However, as I argue in this section, this view is not friendly to Weinberg’s own
account of the experimental critique, for current experimental studies seldom present useful textual
cues to respondents.
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By using such contextual information, Lehrer also means to bring the reader’s attention to the
general intuition about the opacity principle—the intuition which, as I argued in the last section,
constitutes Lehrer’s main evidence against externalism.
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neither explicitly called to attention nor highlighted by reasoning or comparison
between cases.44
The aspect that Lehrer emphasizes is ordinary, in the sense that it is more
familiar to most people than the Truetemp case itself. While no one encounters
anyone exactly like Mr. Truetemp in real life or knows of any thermometer that can
give rise to beliefs, most people frequently experience cases where one believes a
certain proposition without knowing the reliability of one’s source. For instance,
readers of tabloid newspapers frequently believe what is said in the papers without
giving a thought to the publication’s reliability. Lehrer’s ordinary case about the
thermometer is another example.45 Since most important philosophical cases are
unusual to a certain extent, it is to be expected that philosophers frequently provide
contextual information to lay stress on more usual features of the esoteric scenarios.
Remember that Weinberg regards ordinary uses of intuition as more corrigible and
trustworthy than the philosophical use. Since one main function of contextual
information is to make salient the ordinary sides of thought experiments,
philosophers’ appeals to intuition turn out to be more “ordinary” than Weinberg
supposes. As a result, by Weinberg’s own criteria, there is good reason to think that
philosophers’ appeals to intuition are more trustworthy than the context-poor uses of
intuition that experimentalists have tested.
One might reply that, even if contextual information can reduce the degree of
variation found in context-poor intuitions, context-rich intuitions might still be
44

One might respond that a reader could infer this information from the vignette; it is a simple
inference from “Charles is unaware that his brain has been altered” to “Charles does not know that he
is reliable at temperature estimation.” However, even simple inferences can be easily neglected when
they are not made salient to a reader.
45
This case might appear unintuitive. However, Lehrer seems to think that it is an intuitive case of
non-knowledge and uses it to stress the ordinary aspects of the Truetemp case. The purpose here is not
to defend Lehrer’s use of the Truetemp case, but to illustrate one important role of contextual
information that is common in philosophy but is often missing from experimental research.
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widely subject to cognitive bias. In response, I agree that even context-rich intuitions
might vary substantially according to irrelevant factors. But the experimental critique
needs psychological data showing that philosophical practices involving context-rich
intuitions are actually unstable. Merely stating the possibility of systematic variation
is not enough to challenge standard philosophical methodology. A few recent
experimental studies (Starmans & Friedman, 2012; Nagel et al., 2013; Turri, 2013)
have started to test more context-rich intuitions on Gettier cases by asking more
comprehension questions, providing well-structured control cases, or dividing the
story into several stages. Importantly, these studies highlight the element of luck in
Gettier cases. Yet, none of them reports any statistically significant variation as a
function of factors such as age, gender, or ethnic background; on the contrary,
subjects are shown to have a broad consensus on knowledge attribution.
The skeptical interpretation of the experimental critique targets intuition as a
general kind. In a sense, any particular finding of intuitive bias adds some degree of
confirmation to this criticism, though one might think that its conclusion is
ultimately too strong to be successful. By contrast, Weinberg’s interpretation has a
more modest conclusion, for he criticizes only the philosophical employment of
intuition. However, Weinberg’s approach faces a different problem: his conclusion
cannot be justified by extant survey data. Experimentalists’ surveys generally test
context-poor intuitions about particular cases, but philosophers more frequently
appeal to general intuitions and context-rich intuitions as evidence. Though the
surveys might show that intuitions are sometimes variable, they have not shown that
philosophers’ appeals to intuitions are problematically sensitive. Still, I think
Weinberg’s interpretation outlines a more promising empirical project than the
skeptical interpretation. The message from this chapter is not that we should
69

disregard the negative program of experimental philosophy altogether, but that those
who work on this program must modify their research methodology. They need to
more carefully examine how philosophers actually use intuition in the evaluation of
theoretical claims.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion

The main theme of this dissertation is to show that experimentalists need to more
carefully examine their metaphilosophical assumptions regarding philosophical
practice. Even the widely accepted assumption that intuition plays a central
evidential role in philosophy deserves scrutiny. I argued that Centrality remains
plausible, but it is important to keep in mind that there are some theoretical
limitations. First, Centrality is plausible only if we adopt a thin notion of intuition.
Supporters of the anti-Centrality response have offered some convincing reasons
against the view that intuition, in the thick sense, occupies any central evidential
status in philosophy. Most philosophers engaged in first-order philosophical issues
are unlikely to use the term “intuition” in the thick sense. Further, intuition in this
sense doesn’t figure in the psychology of philosophical thinking.
Second, we shouldn’t understand Centrality as an exceptional feature of
philosophy. Some critics of Centrality, especially Cappelen, seem to assume that
supporters of Centrality treat it as a form of philosophical exceptionalism. However,
intuition in the thin sense plausibly plays a central evidential role not only in
philosophy, but also in other disciplines like empirical sciences. In response, I
surveyed different approaches to explicating the experimentalists’ argument. While
the skeptical interpretation of the experimental critique does depend on the
assumption that philosophers distinctively make use of intuitions, more moderate
interpretations do not. This suggests that the experimentalists’ project is more
promising given a moderate interpretation; they should aim to contend not that
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intuition is generally unreliable, but that some particular types of intuitions or some
particular types of activities involving intuitions are untrustworthy.
Third, we shouldn’t understand Centrality as implying that intuition plays the
only central evidential role in philosophical inquiry. The view that philosophical
evidence only consists of intuition is untenable. Williamson argues that this view
may stem from the false principle that evidence has to work as a neutral arbiter
between different sides of the debate. The falsity of the “intuition-only” view of
philosophical evidence suggests that experimentalists should conceive of themselves
as challenging a central part of philosophical methodology, instead of challenging
philosophical methodology as a whole.
Fourth, we should understand Centrality as a claim neutral to whether the
propositional theory or the non-propositional theory of evidence is correct. Centrality
merely claims that intuition plays a central evidential role, but what exactly that role
might be can depend on which specific theory of evidence turns out to be true. The
same thing is true of perception. Though theorists differ as to how precisely
perception plays its evidential role, almost no one denies that perceptual experiences
occupy a central evidential role in empirical sciences. Based on an analogy between
intuition and perception, I argued against Deutsch’s argument from reasoning. An
argument in the case of perception, with the same structure as Deustch’s argument,
doesn’t offer a good reason against the view that perception plays a central evidential
role. Therefore, it remains unclear why we should reject Centrality on the basis of the
argument from reasoning.
I also argued that experimentalists have relied on false assumptions concerning
how philosophers make use of intuitions. Experimentalists assume that, when
philosophers appeal to intuitions, they usually appeal to specific case intuitions. In
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contrast, I have presented several arguments for the claim that it is general intuition
that plays a more prominent evidential role in philosophical practice: (i) The claim is
supported by philosophers’ use of “prima facie” when they are talking about case
intuitions; (ii) general intuitions are frequently used to support philosophers’
theoretical arguments for thought-experimental judgments; and (iii) general
intuitions explain well why we are able to know that different thought experiments
are based on the same rationale. Especially, I contend that general intuitions explain
well the persistence of the specific intuition in the Gettier case. Further, I argued that
general intuitions play a key role in some other famous thought experiments,
including the Truetemp case, the China-brain case, and the Mary case.
Still, I take it that philosophers sometimes do grant case intuitions a substantial
evidential role. Yet, the surveys that experimentalists have conducted so far usually
elicit intuitions in a context-poor way; subjects report their intuitions in response to
vignettes with little contextual information. Experimentalists thus seem to assume
that the use of case intuition in philosophy is typically also context-poor. I argued
against this assumption by showing that philosophers normally elicit case intuitions
through texts providing a substantial amount of contextual information.
The above two differences between philosophers’ and surveys’ appeals to
intuitions lead to negative consequences for the experimentalists’ argument. In
particular, I argued that these two differences raise a serious problem with
Weinberg’s 2007 interpretation of the experimental critique: there is currently not
enough experimental data to support his argument. This is particularly worrying for
experimentalists given that they seem to need a non-skeptical interpretation and that
Weinberg’s 2007 version is one of the most worked-out examples in the literature.
There is no denying that future experimental studies, by representing philosophical
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practice more accurately, might ultimately favor Weinberg’s conclusion. At present,
however, this remains nothing but a possibility.
I finally stress that all the above metaphilosophical assumptions that I have
examined are general empirical hypotheses, and to defend or criticize them requires
more work than what has been done in this dissertation. I don’t take myself as having
already offered knock-down arguments for or against the above hypotheses.
However, I intend this dissertation to provide sufficient reasons to motivate
experimentalists to rethink the accuracy of their descriptions of the philosophical
practices involving uses of intuitions. Indeed, empirical methods borrowed from
other disciplines (e.g., statistics) can be helpful in systematically investigating the
use of intuition in philosophy. Given the complexity of the issue and its close
relevance to the experimental critique, experimental philosophers might be motivated
to pursue a new research project in the future, which concerns how philosophers
actually use intuitions rather than how they should use them in the evaluation of
philosophical theories.46

46

There are already few studies working on this direction. Andow (2015), for example, examines the
use of “intuition”-terminology in journal articles through the JSTOR database.
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